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Baha’is in Yazd Face Widespread Raids, Interrogations, and Prison Sentences

Posted on October 16, 2026October 16, 2026 by . .

News, Publications, Religious Minorities

Ahmad Naeimi, Baha'i citizens, Bahais, Farhang Amiri, Flora Samadani, Iman Rashidi, Majid Ghaneh, Payam Amiri, Shahrokh Nasiri, Soheil Rouhanifard, Yazd

HRANA – From March to October 2026, dozens of Baha’i citizens in Yazd faced security and judicial actions, including home searches, confiscation of personal belongings, summonses for interrogation, and judicial prosecution. During this period, a gathering attended by approximately 50 people was dispersed, 18 summonses for interrogation were reported, and three citizens were sentenced to prison. Additionally, one citizen was transferred to prison to serve a sentence. During these operations, agents confiscated mobile phones and other personal belongings belonging to citizens, their guests, and family members, some of which have yet to be returned. This report examines the details of these incidents.

According to HRANA, between March 28 and October 15, 2026, security and judicial actions against Baha’i citizens in Yazd extended beyond those facing legal proceedings, affecting participants in private gatherings, guests, and family members. During this period, security agents searched numerous homes and confiscated mobile phones, electronic devices, books, photographs, and religious items associated with the Baha’i Faith. In one case, agents also seized a citizen’s private vehicle.

A review of the incidents indicates that Shahrivar (23 August–September 22) saw the highest number of security-related actions. During that month, six residential homes were searched, and six citizens were summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence for interrogation. In Mehr (23 September–October 15, 2026), four residential homes and a farm were also searched. One of these operations took place on the tenth anniversary of the murder of a Baha’i citizen and involved approximately 40 security agents.

Type of Action	Recorded Figures
Total Recorded Incidents	Approximately 34
Searches of Premises	11
Dispersal of Private Gathering	1 gathering, approximately 50 attendees
Summonses for Interrogation	18
Prison Sentences Issued	3 individuals
Enforcement of Prison Sentences	1 individual
Total Prison Sentences Imposed	20 years, 1 month, and 20 days

Of the 11 recorded searches, 10 involved residential homes, while one involved a farm belonging to a Baha’i family. The approximately 18 reported summonses included around 12 in Tir (22 June–22 July) and six in Shahrivar . These figures do not necessarily indicate that 18 different individuals were summoned. Similarly, the total of approximately 34 incidents represents the combined number of actions listed in the table, rather than the number of individuals affected or separate operations carried out by security agents.

Dispersal of a Private Gathering and Summonses of Participants

The first incident in this series of security actions was reported on March 28, 2026. On that day, approximately 50 Baha’i citizens in Yazd had gathered to share ash, a traditional Iranian soup, in keeping with a local custom. Agents from the Ministry of Intelligence arrived at the location, dispersed the gathering, and confiscated the attendees’ mobile phones.

According to information received, the agents did not present a judicial warrant when confiscating the phones. Although most attendees approached the relevant legal authorities to recover their belongings, the phones have yet to be returned to their owners.

In Tir, approximately 12 participants in the gathering were summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence for interrogation. No information is available regarding the official reasons for these summonses or any potential charges brought against them.

Searches of Baha’i Citizens’ Homes and Confiscation of Personal Belongings

In Shahrivar, security agents searched six residential homes belonging to Baha’i citizens in Yazd. During these operations, they confiscated not only the homeowners’ belongings but also the mobile phones of their guests.

On August 26, security agents searched the home of Shahrokh Nasiri. During the operation, they confiscated the mobile phones of six guests present at his home.

On September 2 and 3, six Baha’i citizens were summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence in Yazd for interrogation. No further information is available regarding the reasons for their summonses or the outcomes of their interrogations.

On September 12, security agents searched the homes of three Baha’i citizens. During these operations, mobile phones and books found in the homes were confiscated. The identities of these three citizens have not yet been established.

One day later, on September 13, the home of Majid Ghaneh was searched. Agents confiscated mobile phones, a laptop, books, photographs, and items associated with the Baha’i Faith. They also seized his personal vehicle.

Approximately eight guests were present at the home during the search, and their mobile phones were also confiscated. One of the guests, Parnia Basiri, who did not have a mobile phone with her, was taken by the agents to her own residence.

After entering her home, the agents searched the premises and confiscated all mobile phones belonging to her family members, along with items associated with the Baha’i Faith.

These incidents demonstrate that the security operations were not limited to the homeowners. At two private gatherings, the mobile phones of approximately 14 guests were confiscated, and in one instance, a guest’s home was also searched.

Searches of a Family’s Homes on the Anniversary of Their Father’s Murder

In Mehr, security operations continued with searches of four residential homes and a farm. Three of these homes belonged to members of the family of Farhang Amiri, a Baha’i citizen who was murdered in Yazd.

On September 27, 2026, coinciding with the tenth anniversary of Farhang Amiri’s murder, approximately 40 security agents arrived at his family’s home.

According to information received, the agents conducted a prolonged search of the residence and confiscated mobile phones, personal belongings, and items associated with the Baha’i Faith.

That same evening, the home of Payam Amiri, Farhang Amiri’s son, as well as the home of his daughter Neda Amiri and son-in-law Maziar Mottahed, were searched. Agents also confiscated a number of their personal belongings.

According to information received, the psychological distress caused by the agents’ presence and the search of the home led to a deterioration in Ms. Amiri’s health, requiring her to be taken to an emergency medical facility.

An informed source told HRANA that the agents had visited the family members’ homes under the assumption that they had organized a ceremony to commemorate the anniversary of Farhang Amiri’s murder.

Four days later, on October 1, security agents arrived at a farm belonging to the Amiri family. After searching the property, they confiscated mobile phones and several items found on the premises.

Farhang Amiri, a 63-year-old Baha’i citizen, was stabbed to death outside his home in Yazd on September 26, 2016. Following their arrest, the two suspects in the case stated that his religious beliefs had motivated the murder.

Ten years after the incident, members of the Amiri family faced searches of their homes and confiscation of their personal belongings on the anniversary of their father’s murder.

Subsequently, on October 15, security agents arrived at the home of Soheil Rouhanifard, another Baha’i citizen residing in Yazd. After searching his home, they confiscated a number of his personal belongings.

Prison Sentences Issued and Enforced Against Baha’i Citizens

In addition to home searches and the confiscation of personal belongings, three Baha’i citizens in Yazd have been sentenced to prison, while another citizen has been transferred to prison to serve a sentence.

Flora Samadani and Ahmad Naeimi, a Baha’i couple residing in Yazd, were sentenced by Branch 1 of the Yazd Revolutionary Court to a combined total of three years, six months, and two days in prison.

According to a verdict issued on October 12, Flora Samadani was sentenced to three years and one day in prison on charges of “deviant propaganda activities contrary to the sacred law of Islam through the promotion of the Baha’i Faith.” Her husband was also sentenced to six months and one day in prison for aiding and abetting the same offense.

Ms. Samadani had previously been arrested on May 3 and released on bail on June 20. Ahmad Naeimi was also arrested on June 13 and released on bail on July 4.

In a separate case, Moein Mohammadi-Dehj, a 39-year-old Baha’i citizen, was sentenced in August by Branch 1 of the Yazd Revolutionary Court to a total of 16 years, seven months, and 18 days of discretionary imprisonment. He was also sentenced to a 10-year deprivation of social rights and a permanent ban from employment in government and public services.

Under Article 134 of the Islamic Penal Code, the most severe sentence of 12 years, six months, and one day in prison will be enforceable against him.

Additionally, Iman Rashidi, a Baha’i citizen residing in Yazd, was summoned to prison on August 23 to begin serving his sentence. After reporting to the judicial authorities, he was arrested and transferred to prison.

Mr. Rashidi had previously served a prison sentence and was released from Yazd Prison in February 2018 after completing his earlier sentence.

Confiscation of Personal Belongings and Failure to Return Seized Property

The confiscation of mobile phones and personal belongings has been a recurring practice in security operations targeting Baha’i citizens in Yazd.

During the gathering in Farvardin (21 Match-20 April, 2026), the mobile phones of approximately 50 people were confiscated. In Shahrivar, the mobile phones of approximately 14 guests at two separate homes were also seized. In other incidents, agents confiscated electronic devices, books, photographs, items associated with the Baha’i Faith, and a private vehicle.

According to information received, despite repeated visits and follow-up efforts by some citizens with the relevant legal authorities, a significant portion of the confiscated property has yet to be returned to its owners. Furthermore, no clear information is available regarding the legal grounds for retaining these belongings or when they might be returned.

The prolonged confiscation of mobile phones and electronic devices can disrupt family communications, professional activities, and citizens’ access to essential information and services, particularly in cases where the communication devices of all members of a household have been seized.

Over the past decade, the Baha’i community in Iran has been subjected to more security and judicial actions than any other religious minority. An examination of annual reports published by HRA’s Department of Statistics and Publications indicates that, during the past year, an average of 62.41% of reports concerning religious minorities involved violations of the civil rights of Baha’is.

Escalating Armed Violence in Southeastern Iran: At Least 63 Armed Incidents in Six Months

Posted on October 12, 2026 by Hrana

Ethnic Minorities, Publications, Religious Minorities

accountability, ArmedConflict, Baloch, Baluchestan, CivilianProtection, Faraja, Fatemiyoun, HRANA, HumanRights, HumanRightsActivists, Iran, IranHumanRights, irgc, SecurityCrisis, SistanAndBaluchestan, SoutheastIran, Zahedan

HRANA – At least 63 armed incidents were recorded across Iran’s southeastern provinces of Sistan and Baluchestan and Kerman between March 31 and October 10, 2026, amid a sharp escalation in armed violence in the region. According to local and unofficial reports, the incidents left at least 94 people dead and 33 injured, while official sources reported 87 fatalities and 10 injuries. The pace of violence accelerated significantly in recent weeks, with 18 incidents recorded in just the final 18 days of the reporting period, surpassing the total for any previous full month. The escalation has also been accompanied by a shift in the nature of confrontations, from targeted shootings and attacks on patrol vehicles to coordinated ambushes, roadside bombings, and the reported use of rocket-propelled grenades and heavier weaponry.

According to HRANA, the pattern of events over the past six months indicates that southeastern Iran is entering a more volatile phase of armed confrontation. This shift has unfolded in a security environment profoundly affected since late winter 1404 by direct warfare between Iran, on one side, and the United States and Israel, on the other. During the same period, government concerns increased over the possibility that armed groups might become more active in border regions. Yet while much of the Iranian government’s public and security attention was focused on developments in the west and northwest, a quieter but sustained pattern of increasing attacks, security operations and armed clashes took shape in the southeast.

Most of the armed incidents were recorded in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, while two were also reported in Faryab County, Kerman Province. Zahedan, Saravan, Iranshahr, and Rask emerged as the main centers of armed confrontation. Meanwhile, signs of growing coordination among some Baloch armed groups have emerged, particularly with the formation of the People’s Fighters Front (Jebhe-ye Mobarezin-e Mardomi). However, many of the incidents remain unclaimed, and available evidence does not establish responsibility for a significant number of attacks.

Data Overview

Group	Killed (official)	Killed (unofficial)	Injured (official)	Injured (unofficial)
Government forces (FARAJA, IRGC, Basij, intelligence agencies, Army)	39	53	9	29
Fatemiyoun affiliated forces	1	9	Unknown	Unknown
Armed individuals	46	25	Unknown	Unknown
Civilians	1	7	1	4
Total	87	94	10	33

Armed Clashes Intensify in September and Early October

A chronological review of the events clearly illustrates how armed clashes have increased over time. After four incidents in Khordad (21 May -21 June), the number rose to 10 in Mordad (23 July-22 August) and 11 in Shahrivar (23 August-22 September). Shahrivar was the most incident-heavy complete month of the period, but that record was broken in the first half of the following month: from 1 to 18 Mehr (23 September-10 October), 18 armed incidents were recorded. In other words, the pace of clashes in Mehr not only exceeded that of previous months, but reached an unprecedented level within less than a full month.

The escalation is evident not only in the growing number of incidents but also in the increasing intensity of armed confrontations. Seven armed attacks were reported in the six days between 13 and 18 Mehr alone (5 -10 October). During the same period, attacks on patrol units, police facilities and multi-vehicle convoys increased, and power or internet outages were reported after clashes in some locations. Taken together, these indicators suggest a gradual shift from isolated attacks toward confrontations that, in some cases, have become longer in duration, heavier in weaponry and broader in geographic reach.

Monthly trend in armed incidents, March 31 to October 10, 2026

From Targeted Killings to Ambushes and Semi-Heavy Weapons

The most frequently recorded type of incident during this period was attacks on patrol vehicles and military convoys, with 17 cases documented. Fourteen targeted shootings of individuals were also recorded; in seven cases, the attacks occurred outside the victims’ homes, workplaces, or along their regular travel routes. Targeted shootings were more common in the earlier months, but in the final weeks, both the weapons used and the nature of the operations changed.

On 10 Mehr (October 2), in the Rudmahi area of Zahedan, a vehicle attributed to Fatemiyoun forces was struck by a booby trap and then came under gunfire. Five days later, reports on the attack against the Law Enforcement Command headquarters in Jalq described the use of mines, RPGs and semi-heavy weapons. On October 9 (17 Mehr), a roadside bomb exploded along the route of a police convoy in Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan. In total, at least seven incidents involved equipment such as drones, artillery, RPGs, armored vehicles or explosives.

Government forces also used drones, artillery, armored vehicles and heavy weapons in several operations. In operations in Jahadabad, Gharibabad and Monzalab, locations of clashes and homes targeted during the operations were destroyed, blown up or set on fire. Such developments, particularly when operations take place in residential settings, increase the risk of harm to civilians and their property and heighten the need for precise documentation of operational methods and their consequences.

Most frequent operational patterns in armed incidents

More Visible Emergence of Armed Opposition Groups

One notable development in recent weeks has been the growing number of armed clashes attributed to the People’s Fighters Front. The organization, which operates as an alliance of several Baloch armed groups, was linked to 11 recorded incidents in total. These include attacks for which it claimed responsibility, participation in certain clashes, and confirmation that some individuals killed in government operations were its members. Ten of those 11 incidents occurred on or after 21 Shahrivar (12 September).

Even so, the available data do not support attributing the overall increase in violence to a single group. Of the 42 incidents initiated by armed actors, a specific claim of responsibility was recorded for only seven attacks: six by the People’s Fighters Front and one by Ansar al-Furqan. A large share of attacks therefore remains unclaimed or cannot be reliably attributed. This makes it difficult to assess the actual capabilities of the groups, their chains of command, or the degree of operational coordination among them.

Fatemiyoun: Disputed Accounts of Presence and Casualties

Accounts involving the Fatemiyoun, a force operating under the IRGC Quds Force and composed primarily of Afghan nationals, have been disputed. While local sources and Baloch armed groups have identified personnel targeted in several incidents, including in Rudmahi, Zahedan, as Fatemiyoun members, Iranian officials and state media have either omitted any reference to the group or provided different accounts of the affiliation of the forces involved.

According to local reporting, at least nine personnel attributed to the Fatemiyoun were killed during this period – one of the principal factors behind the gap between official and unofficial casualty figures for government and affiliated forces. Four deaths were reported in the 20 Shahrivar (11 September) attack on a patrol attributed to the Fatemiyoun in Rudmahi, and five more in the 10 Mehr ( 2 October) attack in the same area. Because there is no independent confirmation and the organizational affiliation of these forces is disputed, these cases should be treated as documented but contested claims rather than conclusive facts about the nature of their deployment or mission.

Two Different Narratives of Fatalities

The divergence between official and local accounts is not limited to the number of casualties. In several cases, the central dispute concerns who the person killed actually was and what role the person played. In local reporting, of 94 deaths, 62 were described as government or affiliated forces, 25 as armed individuals and seven as civilians. Official accounts, by contrast, reported 40 government and affiliated personnel, 46 armed individuals and only one civilian killed.

These two sets of figures should not be added together; they are parallel narratives of the same period. The gap is especially pronounced in two areas: first, a difference of 22 in the number of government and affiliated personnel reported killed; and second, 21 people whom officials described as armed or as perpetrators, but whose identities or deaths were not confirmed by local sources or related groups. In addition, local sources described at least five people whom official accounts labeled ‘armed’ or ‘attackers’ as civilians.

A specific dispute over the identity or affiliation of victims was documented in eight incidents. In 11 other incidents, casualties were reported but the precise number of dead or injured was unclear. Any aggregate casualty figure should therefore be read as the minimum that can be extracted from the available reporting, not as a definitive count of every victim.

Comparison of official and local accounts of fatalities

Civilians Caught Between the Two Sides

Civilian deaths and injuries are among the most serious aspects of the recent developments. On 2 Mehr (24 September), as clashes continued in Jahadabad, Saravan, a nine-year-old child, Mohammadamin Dehghan, and his father were shot while traveling in a vehicle carrying water; the child died several days later. On 17 Mehr (9 October) in Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan, a passing civilian, Abdollah Ghanbarzehi, was killed by gunfire from forces present at the scene, while state media published a different account of his role.

There are other cases in which families or local sources rejected the official claim that those killed were armed, including two people killed in Rask on 2 Ordibehesht (22 April) and two people in Kahnoak village in Taftan. These disputes underscore the importance of publishing verifiable information on the identity of victims, whether they were armed, the precise circumstances in which lethal force was used, and the results of post-incident investigations.

Two abductions of government personnel were also recorded during this period, resulting in three deaths. Delays in returning the bodies of some of those killed were also reported, including the return of bodies from the Berenjinan operation after 30 to 48 days. In the case of Abuzar Hamli, who was killed in the Bidedlad clash, local sources alleged that 10 billion tomans were demanded in exchange for the return of his body. These allegations require independent investigation and transparent responses from the responsible authorities.

Geography of Violence: Concentration in Underserved Areas

Of 61 incidents for which the location is known, 37 occurred in four counties: Zahedan, Saravan, Iranshahr and Rask. Zahedan ranked first with 11 incidents, while Saravan and Iranshahr recorded nine each and Rask eight. Both incidents recorded in Kerman Province occurred in Faryab County. This concentration indicates that most of the violence is occurring within a defined geographic belt and in areas that have for years faced deep challenges in development, employment, infrastructure and access to public services.

This economic and social context matters for understanding the region’s security developments. A 2025 International Crisis Group report, citing official Iranian data, placed Sistan and Baluchestan near the bottom of national development indicators and noted that 12 of the province’s 26 counties were among the country’s 20 poorest counties. The same report cited a provincial unemployment rate of 12.4 percent in 1402, compared with a national average of 8.1 percent. The United Nations Development Programme also emphasized in 2025 the severe pressure of water scarcity and prolonged drought on livelihoods and community resilience in parts of the province.

Economic deprivation by itself does not explain armed violence, and the coexistence of the two does not establish a definitive causal relationship. However, neglect of development gaps and an exclusively security-centered approach to the region can deepen mistrust, social vulnerability and cycles of violence. In an area already facing unemployment, infrastructure shortages and environmental pressures, expanding armed operations have consequences beyond direct casualties: restrictions on movement, communication disruptions, property damage, intensified military presence and greater risks to local communities.

Geographic concentration of armed incidents in southeastern Iran

Arrests and the Need for Accountability

At least 19 arrests directly linked to incidents in this period were specifically documented: 16 on the basis of official statements and three in local reporting. This total does not include Fars News Agency’s aggregate claim on 26 Farvardin (15 April) that 55 people had been arrested, because the locations, precise timing and details of those arrests were not disclosed and may overlap with other documented cases.

When accounts differ so sharply over casualty figures and even the identities of those killed, establishing accountability requires more than aggregate statistics. Essential steps include disclosing the names and legal status of detainees, providing information about their whereabouts and the charges against them, ensuring families have access to information, and conducting independent investigations into reported deaths and injuries. Clarifying the circumstances surrounding the use of lethal force, investigating reports of homes being destroyed, and examining allegations that the return of victims’ bodies was delayed or made conditional are also necessary to establish the facts and ensure accountability.

Southeastern Iran Requires Attention Beyond a Security-Only Approach

The clashes of the past six months show that developments in southeastern Iran can no longer be viewed as a series of isolated and disconnected incidents. The rising number of events, their concentration in several counties, the introduction of heavier weapons into some confrontations, the more visible presence of an armed alliance, and the widening gap between official and local accounts of casualties together point to an escalating trend.

This trend is unfolding in one of Iran’s most underserved regions – an area that has long faced development gaps, unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, a water crisis and a sense of deprivation. Turning such an environment into an arena of increasingly armed confrontation risks once again placing the heaviest burden on local civilians: through loss of life, damage to homes and livelihoods, arrests and security restrictions, and deepening mistrust between society and state institutions.

Reducing that risk requires more than an expanded security presence. Independent and transparent documentation, effective protection of civilians, investigations into suspicious deprivations of life, accountability for operations in residential areas, protection of detainees’ rights, and serious attention to the region’s structural deprivation are among the measures that could help prevent the cycle of violence from deepening. The pattern documented through 18 Mehr (10 October) indicates that without such an approach, the risk of continued and escalating tensions in southeastern Iran remains serious.

Detailed Table of Incidents

The table below lists 63 armed incidents recorded from March 31 to October 10, 2026 (11 Farvardin to 18 Mehr 1405), including date, location, type of attack or clash, casualties, victim/attacker attribution and reporting sources. The information was compiled from local reporting and official statements; cases involving conflicting accounts or lacking independent confirmation are presented with those qualifications.

On smaller screens, scroll horizontally to view the full table.

#	Date	Location	Type of attack / clash	Casualties	Victim / attacker attribution	Summary	Primary source
Farvardin 1405
1	March 31, 2026 (11 Farvardin)	Mirjaveh, outside the IRGC Intelligence building	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed (Lt. Col. Mohammadreza Rahdar); 1 civilian wounded, according to police	Victim: military officer. Assailants: unidentified armed individuals; no claim of responsibility.	Rahdar was shot outside the IRGC Intelligence building in Mirjaveh and killed.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
2	March 31, 2026 (11 Farvardin)	Kalat, Sarbaz County	Shooting at police vehicle	2 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Reza Roozgerd; 2nd Lt. Mohammadreza Aram)	Victims: Kalat Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA). Assailant: unknown. Provincial police later claimed a suspect had been arrested in Rask.	A Samand vehicle belonging to the Kalat police command came under fire; Roozgerd died at the scene and Aram later died in hospital.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
3	April 3, 2026 (14 Farvardin)	Delgan County, one of the county villages	Shooting at patrol	2 killed (Hojatoleslam Hossein Abdollahi; Capt. Nasser Abdollahi)	Victims: head of the Basij of Delgan seminary students and commander of the Mirem Basij sector. Assailant: unknown.	The two Basij officials were shot while on patrol; the Delgan governor confirmed their deaths.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
4	April 9, 2026 (20 Farvardin)	Iranshahr, urban area	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Mehran Shiheki)	Victim: local Baloch FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.	Shiheki was shot in Iranshahr and killed; provincial police confirmed the incident.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
5	April 11, 2026 (22 Farvardin)	Jalq, Golshan County, outside victim’s home	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed (Madad Sepahi)	Victim: local IRGC member. Assailants: two unidentified motorcyclists.	Sepahi was shot outside his home while returning from a work shift; sources said he had been dissatisfied with his service in the IRGC.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
6	April 15, 2026 (26 Farvardin; date of announcement)	Sistan and Baluchestan Province; locations not disclosed	Claimed security operations (aggregate figure)	13 killed and 55 arrested (official claim)	According to Fars News Agency: members of “terrorist teams” linked to Israel and the United States.	Fars reported that, since the start of the war, 13 people had been killed in operations and 55 arrested; no independent details were released.	Documents Network
7	April 16, 2026 (27 Farvardin)	Saravan, urban area	Shooting at patrol vehicle	3 killed (2nd Lt. Mehdi Nasiri-Sedeh; Sgt. 1st Class Ahmad Sheikhi; Sgt. 1st Class Mohammadreza Shagozaei)	Victims: FARAJA Emergency Unit. Assailants: unknown; no claim of responsibility.	Armed individuals opened fire on an Emergency Unit patrol vehicle in Saravan, killing three officers.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
8	April 19, 2026 (30 Farvardin; date of announcement)	Iranshahr-Khash road, police-road checkpoint	Clash at checkpoint	1 killed and 1 arrested among vehicle occupants (police claim)	Government side: tactical police unit. Vehicle occupants: unidentified; police account.	The southern provincial police commander said occupants of a Peugeot ignored an order to stop and opened fire; weapons and ammunition were reportedly found.	Documents Network
Ordibehesht 1405
9	April 22, 2026 (2 Ordibehesht)	Near Jakigur, Rask County	IRGC shooting / claimed destruction of “terrorist team”	2 killed (Mohammadakram Akhtari; Mohammad Eslam Saeidi)	Official account: members of an armed team. Family account: ordinary civilians from Darchub, Sarbaz.	An IRGC Land Cruiser opened fire on a vehicle carrying the two men without a stop; state media called it the destruction of a terrorist team, while their families rejected the claim.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
10	April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)	Rask County	Shooting at IRGC vehicle	No casualties reported, according to state media	Target: IRGC forces. Assailant: unknown.	An IRGC vehicle was fired on at dawn in Rask; Tasnim called the attack unsuccessful and said the assailants fled.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
11	April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)	Zahedan, Baghri Street, Shirabad	Shooting at patrol vehicle	3 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Mohammadreza Nezamdoost; 1st Lt. Ali Momeni; Ali-Asghar Goldavi); 1 wounded	Victims: FARAJA patrol. Assailant: Ansar al-Furqan, which claimed responsibility.	A police patrol in Shirabad, Zahedan, was raked with gunfire; two of the wounded later died in hospital.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
12	April 29, 2026 (9 Ordibehesht)	Exit of Jakigur, Rask County	Attack on military convoy	Col. Mahmoud Baghbani and several companions wounded	Victim: commander of the Rask IRGC/Basij Resistance District. Assailant: unknown.	A three-vehicle convoy carrying the Rask IRGC commander was attacked; he was transferred to Zahedan for treatment.	Documents Network
13	May 20, 2026 (30 Ordibehesht)	Saravan County, one of the connecting roads	Shooting and clash after pursuit	1 police officer killed (3rd Lt. Amirhossein Shahraki); 2 attackers killed, police claim	Victim: FARAJA. Assailants: armed occupants of a vehicle; identities unknown.	Police said vehicle occupants shot at officers; police claimed two attackers were killed and reported finding weapons, a Starlink terminal and a Peugeot.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
Khordad 1405
14	May 28, 2026 (7 Khordad)	Iranshahr, Basij Square / Hafez intersection	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed (2nd Lt. Isa Abbasi)	Victim: FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.	Abbasi was shot while traveling by motorcycle to work and died at the scene.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
15	June 5, 2026 (15 Khordad)	Zabol border area	Border clash (official claim)	6 attackers killed (claim); death of border-service conscript Seyed Mostafa Hosseini also announced June 7, exact time unclear and possibly related	Government side: FARAJA Border Command. Assailants: unnamed “terrorist group.”	The border commander claimed an armed group intended to cross the border and attack border posts; no identities or evidence regarding the six reported dead were released.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
16	June 7, 2026 (17 Khordad)	Berenjinan area, Saravan	Joint IRGC/Intelligence operation using a drone	4 group members killed (Jalil Nahtani; Mohammad Omar Nahtani; Yasin Mohammadzehi; Vahid Shahuzehi); 1 IRGC member killed (Mohammad Siahani); 1 wounded	Those killed on the armed side: members of the People’s Fighters Front, later confirmed by the Front. Government side: IRGC Quds Headquarters and intelligence forces.	The clash lasted from about 2 to 8 a.m.; the IRGC reported weapons and a Starlink terminal. Bodies were returned to families after 30-48 days.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
17	June 19, 2026 (29 Khordad)	Khash	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed (3rd Lt. Abdolsalam Kord)	Victim: Khash Law Enforcement Command. Assailant: unknown.	A Khash police officer was targeted during a mission and killed.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
Tir 1405
18	June 29, 2026 (8 Tir)	Saravan, near the IRGC building, opposite Imam Ali gas station	Shooting at private vehicle	2 killed (Amirhossein Arbabi; his wife, Fatemeh Bameripur)	Victim: IRGC Intelligence officer. Tasnim described the assailants as a “terrorist group affiliated with the Zionist regime and the United States”; no group claimed responsibility.	Arbabi was attacked minutes after leaving the IRGC building; his wife died in hospital the following day.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
19	June 30, 2026 (9 Tir)	Naskand police station and district office, Sarbaz	Armed attack on police station / exchange of fire	No casualties reported	Target: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.	Armed individuals fired on the Naskand police station at about 1 a.m. and withdrew after an exchange of fire; internet service in the area was cut.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
20	July 1, 2026 (10 Tir)	Sib and Suran	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed (3rd Lt. Mohammad Palangi)	Victim: local Sunni Baloch FARAJA officer. Assailant: unknown.	Palangi was shot while traveling from home to work and killed.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
21	July 2, 2026 (11 Tir)	Zabol, Mohammadabad industrial town	Abduction and killing	1 killed (Capt. Seyed Mehdi Abdollahi, 51)	Victim: Zabol Border Regiment, Qaleh Rostam South post. Assailants: unidentified armed men.	The border officer was abducted while traveling to duty; on 1 Mordad his family was informed that he had been killed.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
22	July 2, 2026 (11 Tir)	Kahnoak village, Taftan	Security raid / claimed operation against “perpetrators”	2 killed (Eqbal Rigi; Bilal Rastaroosh); 1 arrested (Meysam Rigi)	Police: two were perpetrators of the killing of FARAJA personnel in Nukabad, Taftan. Local sources: civilians, with no armed clash.	Dozens of military vehicles blocked the road and a Peugeot Pars carrying two civilians was reportedly fired on without warning; forces then raided the Rigi family home.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
23	July 4, 2026 (13 Tir; date of announcement)	Zahedan, Chabahar, Iranshahr, Khash and Taftan	Claimed security operation	2 killed and 10 arrested (Intelligence Ministry claim)	Official account: members of “operational cells” of an armed group; operation involved the Intelligence Ministry, IRGC and FARAJA.	The Intelligence Ministry reported finding a machine gun, Kalashnikov rifles, 17 pistols, 14 grenades and Starlink equipment; identities and locations of the two deaths were not disclosed.	Documents Network
24	July 10, 2026 (19 Tir)	Zahedan County; bodies later found about 5 km from a checkpoint	Abduction and killing	2 killed (3rd Lt. Afshin Saadati-Kia; Reza Karimian)	Victims: FARAJA tactical unit. Assailant: “an armed group,” according to relatives.	Two tactical-unit officers were abducted while on duty and killed the same night; their bodies were found on 12 Mordad.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
Mordad 1405
25	July 23, 2026 (1 Mordad; date of announcement)	Jakigur Border Regiment area, Rask	Border clash (official claim)	2 attackers killed (claim)	Government side: FARAJA Border Command. Assailants: unnamed “terrorist group.”	The border commander claimed two members of an armed group were killed and weapons, fuse and explosive detonators were recovered; exact time and location were not disclosed.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
26	July 26, 2026 (4 Mordad)	Sarzeh area, Iranshahr	Shooting at private vehicle carrying personnel	1 killed (Noorollah Narouei, died 13 Mordad); 1 wounded (Emamdadi)	Victims: plainclothes FARAJA recruitment personnel. Assailant: unknown.	A privately plated Samand carrying two FARAJA personnel was shot; Narouei died ten days later.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
27	July 29, 2026 (7 Mordad)	Iranshahr, Khatam al-Anbiya 5 Street, outside home	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed (Mehran Salarzadeh)	Police: law-enforcement officer. Local sources: deputy director of the Iranshahr Intelligence Department. Assailant: unknown.	Salarzadeh was shot several times outside his home at about 10:30 p.m. and killed.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
28	July 30, 2026 (8 Mordad)	Abu al-Fazl Mosque checkpoint, Iranshahr-Delgan road	Attack on checkpoint	1 confirmed killed (Sgt. 1st Class Meysam Karami Qaleh-Taki); local sources reported additional dead and wounded	Victims: FARAJA. Assailants: armed vehicle occupants; police reported three vehicles, Haalvsh one.	At about 1 a.m., the checkpoint came under heavy fire; the assailants fled after several minutes.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
29	August 6, 2026 (15 Mordad)	Mirjaveh, near Behdasht Boulevard, site used by security forces	Explosion, cause unknown	Unspecified number of personnel killed and wounded, according to sources	Location possibly linked to the Intelligence Department or IRGC Intelligence. Cause unknown; sources suggested a possible internal origin.	A powerful explosion occurred at about 3:20 a.m. and wounded personnel were reportedly transferred to Zahedan; officials did not explain the incident and no group claimed responsibility.	Haalvsh
30	August 11, 2026 (20 Mordad)	Khash, Morad Rigi Street near 22 Bahman Square	Attack on mobile checkpoint	Unspecified; initial reports said government forces suffered casualties	Target: joint military, police and plainclothes checkpoint. Assailant: unknown.	A nighttime mobile checkpoint was fired on and an exchange of fire continued for several minutes.	Haalvsh
31	August 13, 2026 (22 Mordad; date of announcement)	Khash County	Claimed security operation	2 killed and 4 arrested (Intelligence Ministry claim)	Official account: two operational cells of armed groups that entered from abroad; operation involved IRGC Quds Headquarters and FARAJA.	The Intelligence Ministry released video and claimed two cells had been dismantled; the claim was not independently confirmed.	Documents Network
32	August 15, 2026 (24 Mordad)	Mirjaveh, near Behdasht Boulevard	Targeted shooting / assassination attempt	1 seriously wounded (Hossein Saadatian; the text also gives “Hassan”)	Victim: head of IRGC Intelligence in Mirjaveh. Assailant: unknown.	Saadatian was shot at about 7:30 p.m. and admitted to the intensive-care unit at Nabi Akram Hospital in Zahedan.	Haalvsh
33	August 20, 2026 (29 Mordad; announced 30 Mordad)	Saravan border / Saravan Border Regiment area	Border clash (official claim)	1 attacker killed (claim)	Government side: Border Guard. Assailants: an armed group allegedly attempting to enter Iran.	Police said the remaining group members fled across the border; Haalvsh said video released in connection with the claim was actually from a 2025 clash in Zabol.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
34	August 22, 2026 (31 Mordad)	Zahedan, Baghri Street, Shirabad, real-estate office	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed (Nader Sarani, 45)	Victim: Basij member, confirmed by IRGC Quds Headquarters; local sources described him as an official at the Hemmatabad base. Assailants: occupants of a vehicle.	Armed men entered Sarani’s real-estate office and shot him dead.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
Shahrivar 1405
35	August 27, 2026 (5 Shahrivar)	Mirjaveh-Zahedan road	Shooting at patrol vehicle	1 killed (2nd Sgt. Ali Heydari-Moghadam); 1 wounded	Victims: FARAJA Border Guard. Assailant: unknown; no claim of responsibility.	A privately plated border-patrol Hilux was raked with gunfire from the front; state media called the attack “terrorist.”	Haalvsh / Documents Network
36	September 3, 2026 (12 Shahrivar)	Hasaruiyeh, Zahedan	House raid / siege / clash	2 killed (Yasin Narouei, 24; “Sajjad,” from Bam)	Government side: military and security forces, reportedly about 25 vehicles. Those killed: armed individuals; affiliation not announced.	A house was surrounded from about 6 a.m.; after a two-hour clash, two armed individuals were killed.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
37	September 5, 2026 (14 Shahrivar)	Vadgar village, Ashar District, Mehrestan	House raid / siege / clash	2 armed individuals killed (Mohammad Delmoradi; Salman Derazehi); 1 arrested; reports of government-force casualties and several civilians wounded	Government side: IRGC, intelligence and FARAJA. Affiliation of the dead not announced.	A house was attacked from about 3 to 10 a.m. with a Goryunov machine gun and RPGs; homeowner Akhtar Sandakzehi was arrested.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
38	September 6, 2026 (15 Shahrivar)	Dehak-Sarjangal road, Kourin, Zahedan	Shooting at vehicle	2 killed (Abolfazl Oudi; Keyvan Ramroudi)	Victims: personnel of the IRGC Shahid Mirhosseini Operational Headquarters. Assailant: unknown.	An unplated Capra vehicle was fired on; both occupants were shot in the head and killed.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
39	September 8, 2026 (17 Shahrivar)	Parud, Rask County, outside victim’s home	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed (Abdolraouf Eshaghi)	Victim: commander of the Parud Basij Resistance Base. Assailants: riders on two motorcycles.	Motorcycle-borne gunmen opened fire on Eshaghi outside his home, killing him at the scene.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
40	September 10, 2026 (19 Shahrivar)	Khash, Sarbaz Street opposite the governor’s office	Attack on mobile checkpoint	At least 3 killed and several wounded, initial local reporting	Target: joint military, police and plainclothes checkpoint. Assailant: unknown.	A nighttime checkpoint near Anar Square was attacked; it was the second attack on a mobile checkpoint in Khash within a month.	Haalvsh
41	September 11, 2026 (20 Shahrivar)	Rudmahi, Kourin District, Zahedan	Attack on patrol of affiliated force	4 killed; one local source initially reported 12	Victims: Hazara Fatemiyoun personnel reportedly deployed by the IRGC. Assailant: “Baloch fighters,” according to sources.	A patrol attributed to the Fatemiyoun came under fire and its vehicle was set ablaze.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
42	September 12, 2026 (21 Shahrivar)	Bakhshan, Saravan	Raid on group position / nine-hour clash	IRGC: 3 government personnel killed (Misagh Sani, Mehdi Sarhadi, Moslem Fazeli) and 4 armed individuals killed, later 5. Front: 4 members killed, 9 government personnel killed, 21 wounded.	Defenders/armed side: People’s Fighters Front. Government side: IRGC Quds Headquarters and security agencies.	The clash lasted from about 4 a.m. to noon and involved heavy weapons and quadcopters. Support teams from the Front broke the siege and six members reportedly escaped.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
43	September 12, 2026 (21 Shahrivar; source discrepancy with 20 Shahrivar)	Saravan, Moallem Street, outside home	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed; identity not released	Victim: plainclothes security force member. Assailants: occupants of a vehicle.	A plainclothes security officer was shot outside his home at about 8 p.m. and later died at Razi Hospital.	Haalvsh
44	September 18, 2026 (27 Shahrivar)	Zahedan, University and Daneshjoo streets	Clash between patrol and vehicle occupants	2 killed (Zakaria and Mehrallah Shahbakhsh); 1 wounded and 1 arrested; 3 government personnel and 2 female bystanders wounded	Government side: IRGC Quds patrol. Vehicle occupants: police described them as armed; relatives denied any affiliation.	The clash began around 12:30 a.m. and lasted about two hours; police announced two armed men killed and one person arrested.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
45	September 21, 2026 (30 Shahrivar)	Bazman-Iranshahr road	Attack on police vehicle	1 killed (Capt. Alireza Mehrabi); 3 wounded	Victims: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.	A police vehicle was attacked in the afternoon; police described the incident as a “terrorist act.”	Haalvsh / Documents Network
Mehr 1405
46	September 23, 2026 (1 Mehr)	Jahadabad (“Dab”), Saravan	Raid on alleged “safe house” / multi-hour clash	2 IRGC personnel killed (Brig. Gen. Hossein Zarifi; Ahmad Herati Zeraati/Zerati); at least 5 wounded according to Documents Network, up to 13 according to Haalvsh; IRGC claimed 5 armed men killed and several arrests; Front said 4 members killed.	Government side: IRGC, intelligence and FARAJA, including commander and intelligence official of Shahid Sajjad Headquarters. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.	Forces surrounded the house, demolished it with a bulldozer and set it on fire; the commander of Shahid Sajjad Operational Headquarters in Saravan was killed.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
47	September 24, 2026 (2 Mehr)	Jahadabad, Saravan (Shushtari and Dabeh)	Renewed clash / shooting by forces	9-year-old Mohammadamin Dehghan wounded and later died on 5 Mehr; his father Eshaq wounded	The vehicle carrying the family was allegedly fired on by military and security forces.	Gunfire and RPG fire continued in Jahadabad at dawn; forces reportedly fired on a family vehicle carrying water.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
48	September 25, 2026 (3 Mehr)	Sarkahuran village, Iranshahr	House raid / clash	1 killed (Obeid Zardkuhi); 1 arrested (Jasem Jamali)	Government side: security forces. Affiliation of the person killed was not announced.	A security raid on a house led to a clash; the reason for the raid was not disclosed.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
49	September 29, 2026 (7 Mehr)	Gharibabad, Iranshahr	House siege / four-hour clash	1 killed (Morteza Sotoudeh, 26)	IRGC media: “armed robber.” Local sources rejected this characterization.	Forces surrounded the house using an armored vehicle, quadcopter and RPG; Sotoudeh reportedly ended his own life after running out of ammunition.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
50	September 30, 2026 (8 Mehr)	Near Magas police-road post, Mehrestan	Shooting at military vehicle	At least 2 wounded	Victims: military and law-enforcement personnel. Assailant: unknown.	A vehicle carrying forces came under fire at about 1:30 p.m., coinciding with the anniversary of Zahedan’s “Bloody Friday.”	Haalvsh
51	October 1, 2026 (9 Mehr)	Entrance to Rask, Ahmadabad FARAJA checkpoint	Attack on checkpoint	1 killed (Sgt. 1st Class Alireza Sanchouli, 24)	Victim: FARAJA. Assailant: unknown.	Armed individuals opened fire on the checkpoint at the entrance to Rask in the early morning.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
52	October 1, 2026 (9 Mehr)	Monzalab (Shahmoradabad township), Zahedan	Raid on group position / clash	IRGC Quds Headquarters claimed 6 armed individuals killed; People’s Fighters Front said 4 members were killed.	Those killed: members of the People’s Fighters Front, according to the Front. Government side: FARAJA and IRGC Quds Headquarters.	Forces raided a house with heavy weapons, artillery and a drone and blew it up after the clash; the IRGC said explosive packages were found.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
53	October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)	Nukabad, Taftan, Intelligence Department building	Armed attack on government building	Unknown	Target: Intelligence Department. Assailant: unknown.	The building came under gunfire at dawn and an explosion, possibly a grenade, was heard.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
54	October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)	Rudmahi, Kalepadeh route, Zahedan	Booby trap and gunfire against patrol vehicle	5 killed according to local sources and the Front, including Ahmad Yaqoubi, an Afghan national; official account: at least 1 killed	Victims: Fatemiyoun forces. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.	A Fatemiyoun Land Cruiser equipped with a DShK heavy machine gun was hit by a booby trap and then gunfire; the official account omitted the Fatemiyoun name.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
55	October 2, 2026 (10 Mehr)	Bidedlad and Shushgim heights, Parud District, Rask	Raid on mountain base / ten-hour clash	IRGC Quds Headquarters claimed 2 armed individuals killed; 1 death confirmed (Abuzar Hamli, 23)	Defenders: People’s Fighters Front. Government side: forces from Rask, Sarbaz, Qasr Qand and Nikshahr using drones and artillery.	The clash lasted from 5:30 a.m. to 3:20 p.m.; armed members escaped the encirclement, and the Front said 15 members left the area.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
56	October 5, 2026 (13 Mehr)	Bampur-Iranshahr road, before Salehin Brigade	Ambush against patrol	Official: 2 killed (2nd Sgt. Amirhossein Qasemi; Sgt. 1st Class Nezam Dastgoshadeh), 1 wounded; witnesses: at least 3 killed	Victims: FARAJA patrol from Nukjoub post. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.	A three-vehicle patrol was ambushed; one Hilux was hit by gunfire and another overturned.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
57	October 5, 2026 (13 Mehr)	Entrance to Jakigur bridge, Rask	Shooting at vehicle carrying personnel	1 killed and 2 wounded (Morteza Sayyadi, Hamed Sayyadi, Morteza Bazi)	Local sources: armed plainclothes personnel of the Jakigur Border Regiment. IRGC media: drivers on the Rimdan border route.	A Peugeot 207 carrying three armed plainclothes personnel came under fire in the evening.	Documents Network / Haalvsh
58	October 7, 2026 (15 Mehr)	Jalq, Law Enforcement Command headquarters, Golshan County	Attack using mine, RPG and semi-heavy weapons	Unspecified number killed and wounded; Front claimed 6 officers were hit	Target: FARAJA. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.	The police headquarters and a support Hilux were attacked in the evening; electricity and internet service in Jalq were cut.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
59	October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)	Lakhshak road, Nosratabad, Zahedan	Attack on patrol vehicle	2 killed (3rd Lt. Vahid Enayat; Sgt. 1st Class Abbas Aghaei); local sources reported 3 killed and 2 wounded	Victims: FARAJA tactical unit. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.	A tactical-unit vehicle was fired on in the morning and a clash followed.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
60	October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)	Karinduk, Nikshahr, Nikshahr-Konarak road	Pursuit and attack on two military vehicles	Official: 1 killed (Mohammadreza Okati), 3 wounded. Local sources: at least 5 confirmed wounded and heavy casualties.	Official account: personnel of the Army’s 88th Armored Division. Haalvsh: Fatemiyoun forces. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.	A Hilux and minibus leaving the Karinduk base were attacked; the wounded were transported by helicopter to Chabahar and Konarak.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
61	October 8, 2026 (16 Mehr)	Faryab town center, Kerman Province	Targeted shooting / assassination	1 killed (Maj. Mehdi Jamshidi)	Victim: FARAJA officer; local sources said he had participated in repression of women protesters in Pashmuki. Assailant: unknown.	Jamshidi’s private vehicle was raked with gunfire in the evening; he was struck by seven bullets and killed.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
62	October 9, 2026 (17 Mehr)	Cheshmeh Ziarat, Zahedan	Roadside bomb and clash	2 killed (Col. Nosrat Eftekhari; Ehsan Dehmardeh) and several wounded; 1 civilian bystander (Abdollah Ghanbarzehi) killed by gunfire from forces	Victims: deputy cultural-social commander of the provincial Law Enforcement Command and security escort. People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility.	A booby trap exploded along a police convoy route; state media described the civilian who was killed as the bomber.	Haalvsh / Documents Network
63	October 10, 2026 (18 Mehr)	Faryab County, Rudbar-e Zamin area, Kerman Province	Police operation against suspect in armed attack	1 killed, according to officials	The person was identified by authorities as the principal suspect in the attack on Mehdi Jamshidi; identity not released.	The Faryab governor said the suspect’s hideout had been identified through intelligence work and police surveillance.	IRNA

Methodology note: Figures for casualties, victim identities and the attribution of some forces are based on cross-checking official reporting, local sources and statements by parties to the clashes through 18 Mehr 1405 (October 10, 2026). Cases without independent confirmation or involving conflicting accounts are presented with those qualifications.

Annual Report on Execution in Iran; Marking the World Day Against the Death Penalty

Posted on October 9, 2026 by Hrana

Executions, Publications

HRANA – Marking the World Day Against the Death Penalty, the Statistics Center of Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) has released its annual report on the use of capital punishment in Iran. The findings point to a sharp intensification in executions, continued secrecy surrounding implementation of death sentences, and an increase in political and security-related executions.

Between October 10, 2025 and October 8, 2026, HRANA documented at least 2,003 executions across Iran on the basis of 1,857 reports, an increase of approximately 29% compared with the previous reporting period. During the same period, 230 people were documented as having been sentenced to death. The full report also includes detailed statistical analysis, profiles of political and security-related executions, and documentation concerning judicial officials involved in issuing or upholding death sentences.

Executions in Iran: Key Figures

Indicator	Data
Total executions documented	2,003
Change from previous period	Approximately 29% increase
Average frequency of execution	Approximately one person every 4.35 hours
Death sentences issued	230
Women executed	47
Juvenile offenders executed	4
Public executions	9
Political and security-related executions	69
Executions unannounced by official sources	Approximately 95%

Rising Executions and the Monthly Pattern

The 2,003 executions documented during the current reporting period represent the highest total recorded across the ten reporting periods examined in the report. Compared with 1,553 executions in 2024–2025, the total increased by approximately 29%. The current figure is also more than 182% above the ten-period average of 710 executions.

Monthly data show that executions peaked in December 2025. By contrast, March 2026 recorded the lowest total among complete months. The October 2026 figure covers only the first seven days of the month and therefore should not be compared directly with full-month totals.

Charges: Murder and Drug Offenses Dominate

The distribution of charges resulting in execution shows a notable shift from the previous period. According to HRANA documentation, 57.56% of those executed were convicted of murder and 36.25% of drug-related offenses. Political and security-related moharebeh or baghi charges accounted for 2.40%; other or unknown charges for 1.10%; security charges including espionage, assassination or bombing for 0.90%; rape for 0.80%; non-political moharebeh for 0.80%; efsad-e fel-arz (corruption on earth) for 0.15%; and economic crimes for 0.05%.

Taken together, murder and drug-related offenses account for more than 93% of all documented executions. At the same time, the increase in political and security-related executions, and the connection of a significant number of those cases to protests, stands out as a defining feature of the current reporting period.

Geography of Executions: Concentration in Several Provinces and Prisons

By location of execution, Razavi Khorasan recorded the highest number with 200 executions, followed by Isfahan with 164 and Alborz with 123. Fars recorded 119, Khuzestan 112 and Lorestan 102. These figures are calculated on the basis of prison location and do not necessarily reflect the place of residence or alleged offense of the person executed.

Per-capita figures provide a different picture, particularly in smaller provinces. The report cautions that prisoner transfers and executions carried out outside a prisoner’s province of origin can inflate provincial rates. Tehran is not included in the per-capita table because no executions were recorded there, and 30 executions with an unknown province were excluded from that calculation.

At the prison level, Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan and Adelabad Prison in Shiraz recorded the highest numbers of executions. The spread of executions across dozens of prisons, alongside clear concentration in several facilities, illustrates both the nationwide scope and localized intensity of the death penalty.

Secrecy, Public Executions and Gender

One of the report’s most significant findings is the continued lack of official transparency. Approximately 95% of documented executions were carried out secretly or without announcement in official or domestic media, while only about 5% were reported through official or domestic sources. This pattern sharply limits public oversight and independent assessment of execution practices.

Of the 2,003 executions documented, 9 were carried out in public, representing about 0.4% of the total. Forty-seven women were executed during the reporting period. Four people whose identities and case histories were verified were under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged offense. Overall, 2.3% of those executed were women, 88.8% were men, and the gender of 8.9% remained unknown in the available data.

In relation to sentencing, HRA documented 230 people sentenced to death. At least 16 of those sentenced were women, 6 were sentenced to public execution, and 74 death sentences were upheld by the Supreme Court.

Ten-Year Trend: The Highest Recorded Level

A review of ten reporting periods shows that, after executions declined from 505 in 2016–2017 to 238 in 2018–2019, the trend turned upward from 2019–2020 onward. The totals then rose through 249, 272, 528, 664, 823 and 1,553 before reaching 2,003 in 2025–2026.

This trajectory places the current one-year increase within a longer pattern of escalation. Continued restrictions on access to official information, together with the very high share of unannounced executions, mean that the documented figures should be understood as the minimum that could be independently verified rather than necessarily the complete number of executions carried out.

69 Political and Security-Related Executions

During the reporting period, HRANA documented 69 people executed on political and security-related charges. Of these, 35 people — approximately 51% — were executed in connection with the January 2026 (Dey 1404) protests. Twenty-nine people were executed in April and May 2026 alone, with 14 in April and 15 in May, marking the peak of executions in this category.

Among these 69 cases, 29 people were executed on charges of moharebeh, either alone or alongside other charges. Where the province was known, Alborz accounted for the largest share with 19 cases, followed by Isfahan with 10. The province was unknown in 20 cases.

The full report provides an individual case card for each of the 69 people, setting out the charge, date of execution, case background, province or city, and prison where available. This case-level documentation allows the aggregate figures to be examined in greater detail and shows the diversity of charges and case backgrounds included within the political and security-related category.

Judicial Actors Involved in Issuing or Upholding Death Sentences

For the first time in this format of the annual report, a dedicated section documents judges and courts identified in death-penalty cases. This research covers October 10, 2025 through September 26, 2026, meaning that its documentation window ends twelve days before the October 8, 2026 cutoff used for the report’s main statistical sections.

HRA’s review found that several judges identified during the current period had also appeared in earlier political, security-related or protest cases involving death sentences. Among the examples examined are Abolghasem Salavati of Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, Iman Afshari of Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, Vahid Hemmatnejad of Branch 5 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court, Ahmad Darvish-Goftar of Branch 1 of the Rasht Revolutionary Court, Reza Najafzadeh of Branch 3 of the Urmia Revolutionary Court, and Seyed Mahmoud Sadati of Branch 1 of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court.

The report emphasizes that this list is not exhaustive. Iranian authorities routinely withhold information about capital proceedings, and public reporting often fails to identify the presiding judge or even the relevant branch. Accordingly, the absence of a judge’s name from the report should not be read as evidence that the judge was not involved; rather, it reflects the limits of independently verifiable information.

A separate section also addresses Supreme Court review and distinguishes between issuing a death sentence at trial and later upholding or reviewing that sentence. The available documentation identifies judges from Branches 9, 20, 39 and 41 of the Supreme Court in connection with specific death-penalty cases.

Methodology and Data Limitations

HRA’s Statistics Center relies on HRANA reporting, a nationwide volunteer network, verified open-source material, and official judicial announcements. Because independent human rights groups cannot operate freely in Iran, access to prisons and courts is restricted, and many executions are deliberately concealed, a margin of error is unavoidable.

The figures in this report therefore reflect the capacity of civil society to document and independently verify executions rather than a claim to a flawless count of every execution carried out. The fact that approximately 95% of executions were not announced by official sources underscores the importance of independent monitoring and verification in assessing the true scale of capital punishment in Iran.

Access the Full Report

The full report contains detailed statistical tables, charts, provincial and prison-level data, profiles of all 69 people executed on political and security-related charges, and the section documenting judicial officials. For case details, sources and supporting data, download and read the complete report.

HRA Investigation Exposes How Digital Matchmaking Platforms Facilitate Child Marriage in Iran

Posted on October 8, 2026October 8, 2026 by Hrana

Children, Publications

Child Marriage

HRANA News Agency – A new investigation by Human Rights Activists (HRA) documents how Iran’s “Adam and Eve” matchmaking platform allows minors to be presented as prospective spouses, while operating within a broader system of state licensing, promotion, financial incentives, and institutional support. The report also examines the role of international technology companies—including Google and Meta—in distributing and promoting services that may expose children to marriage, exploitation, and other forms of harm.

Human Rights Activists (HRA) has published a new investigative report, Child Marriage in the Digital Age, examining how digital matchmaking services in Iran are creating new pathways through which child marriage can be facilitated and normalized.

The investigation focuses on Adam and Eve (Adam va Hava), a government-licensed Iranian matchmaking platform, but places the service within a much wider legal, political, financial, and technological ecosystem. The report examines Iran’s marriage laws and demographic policies, the state system for licensing and monitoring matchmaking services, state-media promotion, financial support for marriage initiatives, institutional links surrounding the platform, and the role played by international technology companies in providing access to and visibility for the service.

The investigation comes amid the rapid expansion of officially authorized matchmaking platforms in Iran. Iranian authorities reported only one licensed matchmaking platform in 2020. By 2023, the number had risen to 33, and by early 2025 more than 200 such services were reportedly operating with government authorization. This growth has taken place alongside state policies intended to encourage earlier marriage, higher fertility, and population growth.

Children Displayed as Prospective Spouses

Among the report’s most significant findings is evidence that minors can enter—and be publicly displayed within—the Adam and Eve matchmaking system.

Although the platform’s terms state that female users must be over 15 and male users over 18 to create accounts, HRA found that the system accepted a birth year corresponding to an age as low as 12, without presenting an age-specific warning or barrier. The platform also permits parents to establish matchmaking profiles for their children, creating another avenue through which minors can be entered into the system.

The platform’s search system allows users to filter prospective spouses beginning at age 13. When HRA searched for girls between 13 and 17 on October 5, 2026, the search returned the platform’s maximum display limit of 100 profiles, suggesting that additional profiles may exist beyond those shown. The results included girls as young as 13 and 14. The report also documents a marriage announcement published by Adam and Eve involving a 16-year-old bride and a 23-year-old groom.

The concerns extend beyond age eligibility. Users complete extensive questionnaires containing information about their location, education, religious beliefs, political views, dress and physical appearance, lifestyle, interactions with the opposite sex, and expectations for a future spouse. The platform also includes self-assessment questions addressing characteristics including physical appearance and sexual desire.

HRA found that information relating to minors could be browsed without logging in and observed no apparent distinction between how the platform displayed information belonging to children and adults. The report further documents how abbreviated matchmaking profiles—including information relating to minors—have been disseminated through messaging channels as advertisements for prospective spouses.

A Broader State Policy Framework

HRA’s investigation argues that the concerns surrounding Adam and Eve cannot be understood solely as the conduct of a private matchmaking company.

Iranian law itself permits marriage below 18. Article 1041 of the Civil Code permits marriage from age 13 for girls and 15 for boys, while marriages below those ages can also take place with guardian consent and court approval. Iran therefore has no absolute minimum age below which marriage is prohibited.

At the same time, the 2021 Law on the Protection of the Family and Youthful Population established a regulatory framework for licensing spouse-selection services and forms part of a broader pronatalist policy intended to reduce the average age of marriage and encourage childbirth.

The report documents several dimensions of state involvement: legal authorization of matchmaking platforms; regulatory monitoring of their activities; promotion through state media; and financial incentives supporting marriage and population policies.

Licensed spouse-finding platforms reportedly submit monthly information to the Ministry of Sports and Youth concerning new registrations, including applicants’ ages and marriages facilitated. According to the report, this means authorities are positioned to receive information concerning the ages of individuals using licensed services—an especially important issue where children are being displayed as prospective spouses.

State television has also actively promoted Adam and Eve. The report documents multiple appearances on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), including calls encouraging young people to register with the platform.

Financial support forms another component of this framework. The report notes that government bodies are required to allocate portions of their budgets to organizations pursuing objectives such as facilitating marriage, encouraging childbirth, and strengthening families. According to figures cited in the investigation, a related 2025 budget line totaled approximately 180 billion tomans, while Adam and Eve reportedly received 17 billion tomans in March 2025 through registrations and marriages involving under-20 and under-15 age groups.

Institutional and Security Connections

The investigation also traces the organizational networks surrounding Adam and Eve.

The platform operates as an initiative of the Imam Reza Society, founded and led by Hossein Yekta, whom the report identifies as a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander. Yekta has publicly supported the platform and appeared in promotional material connected to it. He has also been sanctioned by the European Union and several European countries in relation to serious human rights violations.

The report goes on to document personnel and organizational connections involving the Imam Reza Society, Astan Quds Razavi-linked institutions, members of Adam and Eve’s leadership and academic structures, and other individuals with backgrounds in state and security institutions.

Taken together, HRA concludes that the facilitation of child marriage through Adam and Eve should not be viewed merely as an isolated failure of private-sector regulation. Rather, the platform functions within an environment of legal authorization, government oversight, state-media promotion, financial incentives, and institutional connections that collectively encourage earlier marriage and family formation.

The Role of Google and Meta

A major part of the report concerns the responsibilities of international technology companies whose services help distribute or promote Adam and Eve.

The Android application has been distributed through Google Play, where the report states it has received more than 100,000 downloads. Despite its matchmaking function and the evidence concerning minors, the application was listed with an “Everyone”/PEGI 3 rating, indicating suitability for all age groups.

The report notes that Google’s policies impose heightened child-protection requirements on dating and matchmaking applications and include mechanisms intended to restrict minors from age-inappropriate functionality. HRA therefore calls on Google to assess whether Adam and Eve complies with its policies concerning age verification, minor access, child safety, profile visibility, and content ratings.

The investigation also examines Meta, because Adam and Eve uses Instagram and Threads to promote its services and direct users toward the matchmaking platform. As of October 2026, its Instagram account had approximately 192,000 followers and nearly 800 posts, while its Threads account had almost 10,000 followers.

The report documents social-media posts explaining how to download and use the matchmaking service, as well as marriage announcements involving minors—including one involving a 17-year-old girl and a 30-year-old man.

The report argues that Google, Meta, and other technology providers should conduct enhanced human-rights and child-safeguarding due diligence where their products distribute, host, advertise, or otherwise facilitate access to services involving minors as prospective spouses.

It also calls for scrutiny of relevant ownership and institutional connections where sanctions-related concerns may arise.

From Domestic Reform to Corporate Accountability

The report concludes with recommendations directed at the Iranian government, United Nations mechanisms, international technology companies, and civil society.

Among them, HRA calls on Iran to establish 18 as the absolute minimum age of marriage, without exceptions; prohibit minors from being publicly displayed as prospective spouses; introduce meaningful age verification and child-safeguarding requirements; and suspend matchmaking services that register, display, or promote children.

The report urges UN mechanisms—including the Committee on the Rights of the Child—to examine the relationship between Iran’s marriage laws, pronatalist policies, and state oversight of digital matchmaking platforms. It also recommends examining child marriage within broader patterns of gender-based discrimination and potential gender persecution.

For technology companies, the recommendations include suspending distribution of matchmaking services pending child-safety review where credible evidence shows that minors are being presented as prospective spouses; independently reviewing age ratings; strengthening age verification and access controls; examining promotional activity; and conducting enhanced human-rights, child-safety, ownership, and sanctions due diligence.

Ultimately, the investigation argues that addressing child marriage in Iran requires looking beyond individual marriages or individual platforms. The issue increasingly intersects with state policy, digital infrastructure, corporate distribution systems, social media, and technology governance.

The report’s central warning is that digital systems through which children can be made visible and accessible as prospective spouses must themselves become part of efforts to end child marriage. Where credible evidence shows that children are being presented for marriage, governments, international institutions, civil society organizations, and technology companies all have responsibilities to examine the systems enabling that harm.

World Teachers’ Day: At Least 47 Iranian Teachers Imprisoned, Detained, or in Exile

Posted on October 5, 2026October 5, 2026 by . .

Freedom of Expression, Labor and Guilds, News, Prisoners, Publications

HRANA – At least 47 current and retired teachers across Iran are imprisoned, detained, or serving sentences of exile, according to data compiled by HRANA on the occasion of World Teachers’ Day. Of those, 13 are serving prison sentences, 32 remain in detention, and two are serving court-ordered exile. This report provides an overview of their latest known status and focuses exclusively on their current circumstances.

World Teachers’ Day, observed annually on October 5, has been commemorated since 1994 and marks the anniversary of the adoption of the 1966 ILO/UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Teachers. The document addresses, among other issues, teachers’ rights and responsibilities, conditions of employment, and standards for their working conditions and education.

Overview of Teachers’ Current Status

Category	Number
Total individuals	47
Serving prison sentences	13
In detention	32
Serving sentences of exile	2
Geographic scope	19 provinces

These 47 teachers are spread across 19 provinces in Iran. Razavi Khorasan has the highest number on the list, with eight individuals. It is followed by Fars and Khuzestan provinces, with five each; North Khorasan, with four; and Alborz and West Azerbaijan, with three each.

Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, Markazi, Isfahan, and Tehran each have two individuals on the list, while Lorestan, Bushehr, Kerman, Zanjan, Gilan, Qazvin, and Ilam each have one.

Names of the 47 Teachers:

Shokrollah Ahmadi, Masoud Farhikhteh, Milad Khorshidi, Amir Rahimi, Reza Amanifar, Ali Ahmadi, Mohammad Rafi Sadeghi, Sabah Valadbeigi, Siamak Sadeghi Chehrazi, Mojtaba Iravi, Mohammad Hassan Davoudi, Bakhtiar Rezvani, Javad Safari, Forouzan Yektaei, Hossein Khaleghi, Ahanali Jahandideh, Hashem Khastar, Javad Laal-Mohammadi, Mohsen Khodaei, Iraj Toubeiha, Shervin Hamideh, Masoud Kiani, Hossein Ramezanpour, Mahmoud Heidarian, Reza Taheri, Sirous Sattarnezhad, Mastoureh Narimani, Farhad Rahmani, Ahmad Alizadeh, Sina Karimi-Mofrad, Sadegh Sedaghat, Abolfazl Khoran, Mehdi Farahi Shandiz, Alireza Mardasi, Aman Jalalinezhad, Mohammad Hossein Sepehri, Reza Kamalvand, Yousef Amini, Zahra Arefi-Mehr, Alireza Shaygan, Arman Shahpourikho, Alan Hekmatirad, Reza Gerami, Ameneh Biraqdari, Fatemeh Zarei, Sattar Zarei, and Abbas Bagheri.

Among those on the list, Alireza Mardasi has been sentenced to death on two counts and one year in prison. The sentences issued against Javad Laal-Mohammadi total 21 years in prison, a portion of which is enforceable. Hashem Khastar has been sentenced to 18 years and six months in prison, while Mohammad Hossein Sepehri has been sentenced to 11 years and nine months in prison.

Teachers Serving Prison Sentences

According to available information, 13 teachers are currently serving their sentences:

• Masoud Farhikhteh – Sentenced to five years, one month, and 17 days in prison and is serving his sentence at Karaj Central Penitentiary.

• Amir Rahimi – Sentenced to four years in prison and is incarcerated at Dorud Prison.

• Mohammad Hassan Davoudi – Sentenced to three years, four months, and two days in prison and is serving his sentence at Urmia Prison.

• Javad Safari – Sentenced to five years in prison and a fine and is incarcerated at Zanjan Prison.

• Abolfazl Khoran – Sentenced to a total of six years and five months in prison and 74 lashes and is serving his sentence at Arak Prison.

• Hashem Khastar – Has been in detention and prison since August 2019. He was sentenced to 18 years and six months in prison, two years of exile, and a two-year ban on leaving the country. He is currently incarcerated at Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad.

• Javad Laal-Mohammadi – Has been in detention and prison since October 2021. His sentences total 21 years in prison, a portion of which is enforceable. In August 2026, he was also dismissed from the Ministry of Education by the Primary Board for Administrative Violations of Employees of the Razavi Khorasan Department of Education.

• Mohammad Hossein Sepehri – Sentenced to 11 years and nine months in prison and dismissal from the Ministry of Education. He is serving his sentence at Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad.

• Aman Jalalinezhad – Sentenced by a criminal court to three years and six months in prison and is incarcerated at Sheiban Prison in Ahvaz.

• Arman Shahpourikho – Currently serving a two-year prison sentence at Sheiban Prison in Ahvaz.

• Reza Kamalvand – Currently serving a five-year prison sentence and has been suspended from his job. He is held at Esfarayen Prison.

• Alireza Mardasi – Incarcerated at Sheiban Prison in Ahvaz and sentenced to death on two counts and one year in prison. According to available information, his sentence has been upheld by the Supreme Court.

• Ameneh Biraqdari – Arrested in January 2026 and transferred to Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad. She was subsequently sentenced to one year in prison. After accepting the verdict and waiving her right to appeal, her sentence was reduced to eight months.

Teachers in Detention

In addition to the teachers sentenced to prison, 32 other teachers remain in detention. They are being held in prisons in various cities across the country, and in several cases, their exact place of detention or the charges brought against them remain unknown.

Fars: Shokrollah Ahmadi, Ali Ahmadi, Hossein Khaleghi, Ahanali Jahandideh, and Sadegh Sedaghat are in detention. Shokrollah Ahmadi was arrested in Nurabad, Mamasani, on September 25, 2026, and, following interrogation, was transferred to the city’s prison. Five other teachers who were arrested at the same time were later released on bail.

Razavi Khorasan: Zahra Arefi-Mehr, Alireza Shaygan, Reza Gerami, and Fatemeh Zarei are in detention.

Kurdistan: Milad Khorshidi and Mojtaba Iravi are in detention.

Khuzestan: Siamak Sadeghi Chehrazi and Mastoureh Narimani are in detention.

North Khorasan: Hossein Ramezanpour, Mahmoud Heidarian, and Abbas Bagheri are in detention.

Alborz: Shervin Hamideh and Reza Taheri are in detention.

Kermanshah: Sabah Valadbeigi and Masoud Kiani are in detention.

Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad: Bakhtiar Rezvani and Sina Karimi-Mofrad are in detention.

Tehran: Mehdi Farahi Shandiz and Sirous Sattarnezhad are in detention.

Additionally, Reza Amanifar in Bushehr, Mohammad Rafi Sadeghi in Sirjan, Forouzan Yektaei in Rasht, Mohsen Khodaei in Javersian, Farhad Rahmani in Takestan, Yousef Amini in Bukan, Alan Hekmatirad in Naqadeh, and Sattar Zarei in Khomeyni Shahr remain in detention.

Teachers Serving Sentences of Exile

In addition to those imprisoned or detained, two teachers are currently serving sentences of exile. Iraj Toubeiha, following his release from Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan, was sent to Dehsalm Rural District in Nehbandan County, South Khorasan Province, to serve a two-year sentence of exile. Ahmad Alizadeh, after completing his prison sentence, is also serving his sentence of exile in Fanuj County.

Conclusion

The cases documented in this report reflect the current circumstances of at least 47 current and retired teachers across Iran, based on information available at the time of publication.

Penalties imposed on individuals in this group include death sentences, lengthy prison terms, flogging, fines, dismissal from the Ministry of Education, suspension from employment, travel bans, and exile. In addition, the legal status of some detained teachers—including the charges against them and, in some cases, their exact place of detention—remains unclear.

Eight Women Face Death Sentences in Iran in Political, Security-Related, and Protest Cases

Posted on September 15, 2026September 15, 2026 by . .

Executions, News, Prisoners, Publications, Women

akhshan Azizi, Arghavan Fallahi, Bita Hemmati, HRANA, Leila Abolhasani, Mahnaz Chardoli, Maryam Hodavand, Souda Ebrahimi Shamsabadi, Taraneh Rahimi, Varisheh Moradi, Zahra Shahbaz Tabari

HRANA – At least eight imprisoned women are facing death sentences in various prisons across Iran. The sentences were issued in cases involving charges including “armed rebellion” (baghi), “enmity against God” (moharebeh), and “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz).

According to HRANA, a review of the judicial cases of imprisoned women shows that at least eight women in different parts of the country are facing death sentences.

These women include Pakhshan Azizi, Arghavan Fallahi, Zahra Shahbaz Tabari, Maryam Hodavand, Mahnaz Chardoli, Leila Abolhasani, Taraneh Rahimi, and Souda (Marzieh) Ebrahimi Shamsabadi.

Four of these women, Maryam Hodavand, Mahnaz Chardoli, Leila Abolhasani, and Taraneh Rahimi, have been sentenced to death in cases related to the protests of the January 2026. Souda (Marzieh) Ebrahimi Shamsabadi is also facing a death sentence in a case connected to security-related developments that occurred during the war. Pakhshan Azizi, Arghavan Fallahi, and Zahra Shahbaz Tabari have been sentenced to death in separate political and security-related cases.

These sentences were issued by various branches of the Revolutionary Courts in Tehran, Isfahan, Rasht, and Bandar Abbas. The judges who issued these sentences include Iman Afshari, Abolghasem Salavati, Vahid Hemmat-Nejad, Morteza Barati, Mohammadreza Tavakoli, Mohammad Ali Darvish-Goftar, and Judge Hajizadeh.

According to the latest available information, the death sentences of Pakhshan Azizi and Arghavan Fallahi have been upheld by the Supreme Court. Zahra Shahbaz Tabari, whose initial death sentence was overturned, has once again been sentenced to death by a parallel branch of the court. The death sentences in the cases of the other five women remain at the trial or appellate review stages.

The latest status and judicial proceedings in each of these prisoners’ cases are detailed below:

	1. Pakhshan Azizi, held in Evin Prison, is one of the women sentenced to death in political and security-related cases. She was arrested in Tehran on August 4, 2023, and in August 2024, Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Iman Afshari, sentenced her to death and four years in prison on the charge of “armed rebellion (baghi) through membership in groups opposed to the country.” Ms. Azizi’s death sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court in January 2025, and her requests for retrial have also been denied.
	2. Arghavan Fallahi, another woman sentenced to death, is being held in Evin Prison. She was arrested in Tehran in February 2025, and her case was heard by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati. Ms. Fallahi was sentenced to death on the charge of “armed rebellion (baghi) through membership in groups opposed to the government and armed action.” The sentence against her was upheld by the Supreme Court in August 2026.
	3. Zahra Shahbaz Tabari, 68, who is held in Lakan Prison in Rasht, is another woman sentenced to death in a political and security-related case. She was arrested at her home in Rasht in April 2025. Ms. Shahbaz Tabari was initially sentenced to death by Branch 1 of the Rasht Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Ahmad Darvish-Goftar, but the Supreme Court overturned the sentence. Her case was subsequently referred for retrial to Branch 2 of the Rasht Revolutionary Court, presided over by Mohammad Ali Darvish-Goftar. On April 14, 2026, the court again sentenced her to death on the charge of “armed rebellion (baghi) through membership and activity in an opposition group.”
	4. Maryam Hodavand, 45 and a mother of two, is being held in Evin Prison. She was arrested in connection with the events of January 8, 2026, in Pakdasht, in a joint case involving three other defendants. Their case was heard by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Iman Afshari. Ms. Hedavand has been sentenced to death on charges including “participation in the killing of two Basij members,” “deliberately setting fire to a religious site,” “destruction of public property,” and “assembly and collusion against national security.” According to the latest available information, the sentence against her remains at the trial-court stage.
	5. Mahnaz Chardoli, held in Qarchak Prison in Varamin, was prosecuted in a case related to the January 2026 protests in Tehran. She and Mehdi Nazer were tried in a joint case before Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati. The charges against her include “attacking a mosque with a Molotov cocktail,” “participating in gatherings,” and “assembly and collusion.” According to available information, Ms. Chardoli has received an initial death sentence, but the status of the sentence before the Supreme Court has not yet been determined.
	6. Leila Abolhasani, approximately 43 years old and the mother of two teenage daughters, is being held in Dowlatabad Prison in Isfahan. She was arrested on January 8, 2026, during protests in Shahin Shahr, Isfahan. Branch 5 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court, presided over by Vahid Hemmat-Nejad, sentenced her to death on the charge of “enmity against God” (moharebeh). Following an appeal by her attorney, the case was referred to the Supreme Court for appellate review. A source close to her family previously told HRANA that the charge against Ms. Abolhasani stems from her presence at and filming of the scene of a fire at a store, while judicial authorities have accused her of involvement in setting the fire.
	7. Taraneh Rahimi, another woman sentenced to death in connection with the January 2026 protests, is imprisoned in Dowlatabad Prison in Isfahan. She was arrested along with a number of protesters in Isfahan, and her case was heard as part of a case known as the “Isfahan Shohada Square” case. Branch 1 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court, with Judges Morteza Barati and Mohammadreza Tavakoli presiding, sentenced Ms. Rahimi and nine other defendants to death and 11 years in prison each. The charges in the case include “enmity against God (moharebeh) through carrying a bladed weapon,” “destruction of public property,” “assembly and collusion,” and “propaganda activity against the regime.” Her sentence remains at the trial-court stage.
	8. Souda (Marzieh) Ebrahimi Shamsabadi, 32, who is held in Bandar Abbas Prison, is the only woman on this list whose death sentence was issued in a case related to security developments during the war. She was arrested on March 29 by Ministry of Intelligence agents and was subsequently tried before the Bandar Abbas Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Hajizadeh. Ms. Ebrahimi Shamsabadi was sentenced to death on the charge of “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz), as well as charges including “insulting the Supreme Leader,” “media and propaganda activities contrary to national security,” “intelligence and security activities on behalf of hostile governments,” and “photographing a military site and sending the images to Persian-language media outlets based outside Iran.” The sentence against her remains at the initial trial stage.

Bita Hemmati and Varisheh Moradi: Death Sentences Overturned, Cases Remain Unresolved Pending Retrial

In addition to the eight women who, according to the latest available information, continue to face death sentences, the cases of Bita Hemmati and Varisheh Moradi are also noteworthy because both were previously sentenced to death and their judicial proceedings remain ongoing. The Supreme Court overturned both prisoners’ death sentences and referred their cases to parallel branches for retrial; however, the final outcomes of their cases remain undetermined.

Varisheh Moradi, who has been in detention since August 2023, was sentenced to death in late November 2024 by the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati, on the charge of “armed rebellion” (baghi). The Supreme Court overturned the sentence in late December 2025 and referred the case to a parallel branch for retrial. A retrial hearing in her case, which had been scheduled for July 2026 before Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, was canceled because Ms. Moradi did not appear. As of the time of this report, the final outcome of the retrial remains unknown.

Bita Hemmati, one of those arrested during the December 2025–January 2026 protests, was previously sentenced by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Iman Afshari, to death on the charge of “conducting operations on behalf of the hostile government of the United States and hostile groups,” and to five years in prison on the charge of “assembly and collusion against national security.” In June 2026, the Supreme Court overturned her death sentence and referred the case to a parallel branch for retrial. Ms. Hemmati, who was arrested in Tehran on January 9, 2026, is currently being held in the women’s ward of Evin Prison. HRANA’s investigations into the outcome of her retrial and her latest judicial status are ongoing.

A Year of Pressure on Lawyers: At Least 135 Targeted by Judicial and Security Authorities

Posted on September 14, 2026September 14, 2026 by . .

Freedom of Expression, News, Publications

Abolfazl Ranjbari, Alireza Farzaneh Jajromi, Amir Bahadorifar, Amir Raisian, Astareh (Maryam) Ansari, Babak Eslami Farsani, Bahar Sahraian, Bahareh Aghaei, Dariush Ganjehpour Qashqai, Ebrahim Parsamehr, Elham Zeraatpisheh, Enayatollah Keramati, Fatemeh Rouhandeh, Golaleh Vatandoust, Hadi Sharifzadeh, Hamid Norouzi, Hassan Younesi, Hesam Pourahmadi, Hossein Shokri, Iman Soleimani, Ja'far Zarei, Jafar Keshavarz, Javad Alikordi, Khosrow Alikordi, Mahmoud Taravat Rouy, Masoud Ahmadian, Masoud Shirmardi Shah-Ghasemi, Masoumeh Pourshahrani, Mehdi Ansari, Mehran Ansari, Milad Panahipour, Mohammad Hadi Jafarpour, Mohammad Najafi, Mohammad Tarighat Esfanjani, Mohammadreza Faghihi, Mohammadreza Tak, Mohsen Darginejad, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Nasser Rezaei Ahangarani, Nazanin Baradaran, Nazanin Salari, Omid Darabi, Reza Gharloghi, Reza Shafakhah, Reza Tayyebnia, Saeed Sheikh, Sepideh Taheri, Seyed Mehdi Karimi Farsi, Seyed Mohammadreza Razavifard, Shadi Falahati, Shahab Soleimani, Shahrzad Sharbiani, Shima Ghosheh, Taher Naghavi, Tahereh Pour-Esmaeili, Teymour Salari, Yilmaz Mehrali Beiglou, Zahra Naghshineh, Zohreh Javani

HRANA – At least 135 attorneys across Iran were subjected to judicial and security measures between September 2025 and September 2026, including arrests, summonses, prison sentences, bans from practicing law, and travel restrictions. HRANA identified 60 of the lawyers across 14 provinces and documented at least 75 additional cases in which the individuals’ names were not made public. The findings point to a marked escalation in pressure on the legal profession, particularly since January 2026. This report details the arrests, prison sentences, cases of lawyers currently behind bars, collective actions, and other restrictions imposed during the period.

According to HRANA, a review of cases documented between September 2025 and September 2026 shows that actions against attorneys during this period ranged from summonses and the opening of judicial cases to arrests, prison sentences, bans from practicing law, travel bans, and other judicial restrictions.

Among the cases compiled, HRANA verified the identities of 60 lawyers across 14 provinces. In addition, information concerning at least 75 other lawyers whose names have not been made public was documented. A significant portion of these cases involved collective actions against lawyers in East Azerbaijan, Fars, and Gilan provinces.

According to the latest available information, at least five lawyers are currently serving prison sentences, at least 11 others have received prison sentences, and the arrests of at least 34 identified lawyers were documented during the period under review. A number of others have faced summonses, the opening of judicial cases, suspension or revocation of their licenses to practice law, travel bans, and other restrictions.

Report at a Glance

Indicator	Number / Status
Total number of lawyers documented in the report	At least 135
Lawyers whose identities have been confirmed	60
Lawyers whose identities have not been made public	At least 75
Geographic scope of identified lawyers	14 provinces
Lawyers currently serving prison sentences	At least 5
Lawyers who have received prison sentences	At least 11
Identified lawyers whose arrests were documented	At least 34

January 2026: Peak of the Arrests

A review of the chronological sequence of documented cases shows that following an increase in actions against lawyers in Gilan Province in September 2025, January 2026 marked one of the most significant periods during the year under review.

In January alone, at least 16 identified lawyers were arrested or subjected to judicial and security-related actions. A significant number of these arrests took place amid the nationwide protests in January.

Shima Ghosheh, Mohammad-Hadi Jafarpour, Jafar Zarei, Jafar Keshavarz, Nazanin Baradaran, Enayatollah Keramati, Omid Darabi, Hossein Shokri, Zohreh Javani, Sepideh Taheri, Teymour Salari, Alireza Farzaneh Jajromi, Fatemeh Rouhandeh, Mohsen Darginejad, Amir Bahadorifar, and Masoud Shirmardi Shah-Ghasemi were among the lawyers whose arrests were reported during January 2026.

Some of these individuals were released after a period of detention upon posting bail or other forms of security. However, actions against lawyers continued in the following months, with new cases of arrests, summonses, and the opening of judicial cases documented in February and March.

At Least Five Lawyers Are Currently Serving Prison Sentences

According to the latest available information, Mohammad Najafi, Javad Alikordi, Taher Naghavi, Seyed Mehdi Karimi Farsi, and Golaleh Vatandoust are currently serving prison sentences.

Mohammad Najafi, an attorney imprisoned in Evin Prison, was sentenced by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court to three years in prison, a fine, and a two-year ban on leaving the country and membership in political and social groups in a case opened against him while he was incarcerated. This case is separate from the sentences he was already serving. In April 2025, the Supreme Disciplinary Court for Judges also permanently barred him from practicing law.

Javad Alikordi, an attorney in Mashhad, was arrested on December 12, 2025. Branch 1 of the Mashhad Revolutionary Court sentenced him to a total of 18 years in prison, permanent disbarment from the legal profession, exile, and additional penalties. According to the latest published information, after approximately four months in solitary confinement, he was transferred to Ward 6.1 of Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad.

Taher Naghavi has been imprisoned in Evin Prison since February 2024. His sentence of four years in prison, a two-year travel ban, and two years of deprivation of social rights was upheld on appeal. In October 2025, Branch 6 of the Disciplinary Court of the Center for Lawyers suspended his license to practice law. Another case was opened against him while he was imprisoned in March 2026.

Seyed Mehdi Karimi Farsi was taken to Evin Prison on January 4, 2026, to begin serving his one-year prison sentence. The sentence had previously been issued by Branch 29 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court and was upheld in full by Branch 36 of the Tehran Province Court of Appeals.

Golaleh Vatandoust, an attorney from Marivan, was arrested on May 2, 2026, to begin serving her sentence and was transferred to Sanandaj Prison. She had previously been sentenced to six years, seven months, and 20 days in prison.

Prison Sentences Issued to at Least 11 Other Lawyers

During the period under review, at least 11 attorneys, Nazanin Salari, Mahmoud Taravat-Rouy, Masoud Ahmadian, Elham Zeraatpisheh, Mehdi Ansari, Mehran Ansari, Babak Eslami Farsani, Mohammadreza Faghihi, Saeed Sheikh, Seyed Mohammadreza Razavifard, and Mohammad Tarighat Esfanjani, received prison sentences and, in some cases, additional penalties. Details of the sentences and the latest status of each lawyer are provided below.

In Fars Province, Nazanin Salari, Mahmoud Taravat-Rouy, and Masoud Ahmadian were each sentenced by Branch 1 of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court to three years in prison and a two-year travel ban. The case against the three lawyers had been ongoing since 2020 and resulted in these sentences in June 2026.

Elham Zeraatpisheh was also arrested in May 2026. In July of the same year, Branch 1 of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court sentenced her to five years in prison on the charge of “assembly and collusion against national security” and one year in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the regime.” She was also sentenced to a two-year travel ban and revocation of her passport for two years. In early August, she was released from Adelabad Prison in Shiraz after posting bail.

Mehdi Ansari was also sentenced to imprisonment and a travel ban as proceedings in his case continued. Mehran Ansari, another lawyer arrested during the January protests, was sentenced in late May 2026 by the Shiraz Revolutionary Court to one year in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the regime.”

Babak Eslami Farsani was sentenced in August 2026 by Branch 23 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court to nine months in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the regime.”

Mohammadreza Faghihi had previously received a prison sentence and additional penalties. He was released from Evin Prison in June 2026 after his request for a retrial was granted.

Saeed Sheikh was sentenced in Tehran to one year and six months in prison, a fine, and a one-year ban from practicing law. In November 2025, he announced that 12 months of his prison sentence had been suspended.

Seyed Mohammadreza Razavifard was also sentenced in late June 2026 by Branch 1 of the Qom Revolutionary Court to 10 years in prison on the charge of “propaganda activity against the country’s national security.”

Mohammad Tarighat Esfanjani, a member of the East Azerbaijan Bar Association, was sentenced in June 2026 by the Osku Revolutionary Court to one year in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the regime” and two years in prison on the charge of “insulting the Supreme Leader and the founder of the Islamic Republic.”

Arrests of Lawyers Across Several Provinces

During the period under review, Zahra Naghshineh, Abolfazl Ranjbari, Yilmaz Mehrali Beiglou, Shahrzad Sharbiani, Shadi Falahati, Hesam Pourahmadi, Tahereh Pour Esmaeili, Mohammadreza Tak, Masoumeh Pourshahrani, Hamid Norouzi, Hadi Sharifzadeh, Dariush Ganjehpour Qashqai, Astareh (Maryam) Ansari, Bahar Sahraian, Ebrahim Parsamehr, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Shahab Soleimani, and Bahareh Aghaei were arrested in various provinces. Some of these lawyers were released after a period of detention upon posting bail or other forms of security, while in some cases legal proceedings against them remain ongoing. Details regarding the arrests and the latest status of each individual are provided below.

In East Azerbaijan Province, Zahra Naghshineh was arrested on September 9 after appearing before Branch 15 of the Investigation Office of the Tabriz Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office. Her case was opened following a report by the Tabriz Intelligence Department concerning her activities and her legal and critical writings.

Abolfazl Ranjbari was arrested in May 2025 and, after approximately one year, was released from Tabriz Prison in May 2026 after posting bail of 50 billion tomans.

Yilmaz Mehrali Beiglou was arrested in Jolfa in July 2025. He was initially transferred to the Ministry of Intelligence’s detention facility in Tabriz and later to Jolfa Prison. He was released after a period of detention upon posting bail. In December of the same year, an interrogation session concerning the charge of “disturbing public opinion” was held at Branch 1 of the Investigation Office of the Jolfa Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office.

In Gilan Province, Shahrzad Sharbiani, Shadi Falahati, and Hesam Pourahmadi were arrested in September 2025. During the same month, Tahereh Pour-Esmaeili, Mohammadreza Tak, and Masoumeh Pourshahrani were also arrested in Rasht. The three lawyers were released after a period of detention upon posting bail or other forms of security.

In Fars Province, Hamid Norouzi was arrested in Shiraz on February 14, 2026. He was released from Adelabad Prison on February 24 after posting bail.

Hadi Sharifzadeh and Dariush Ganjehpour Qashqai were also arrested in Shiraz during the winter of 2025–2026 and were subsequently released.

Astareh (Maryam) Ansari and Bahar Sahraian were separately arrested in May 2026 and transferred to Adelabad Prison in Shiraz. The two lawyers were released from prison in late July of the same year after posting bail.

In Khuzestan Province, Ebrahim Parsamehr was arrested in June 2025 and transferred to Sheiban Prison in Ahvaz. An indictment was subsequently issued in his case, which was referred to the Ahvaz Revolutionary Court. HRANA continues to investigate his latest status.

Nasrin Sotoudeh was also arrested in Tehran in April 2026 and was later released from the Greater Tehran Prison on a surety bond.

In Kermanshah Province, Shahab Soleimani was arrested by IRGC Intelligence forces in Ravansar County on July 17. According to information received, he was released after a period of detention upon posting bail or other forms of security.

Bahareh Aghaei was also arrested by security forces in January 2026 and transferred to Qarchak Prison in Varamin. According to the latest available information, she has remained in detention for more than seven months without resolution of her legal status.

Collective Actions Against Lawyers in East Azerbaijan, Fars, and Gilan

A significant portion of the 135 cases documented in this report relates to actions taken collectively against groups of lawyers, not all of whose identities have necessarily been made public.

The largest number of collective summonses during the period under review was recorded in East Azerbaijan Province. According to available reports, more than 40 lawyers who are members of the province’s Bar Association were summoned by the Judiciary’s Intelligence Protection Office, and cases were opened against some of them. Charges in some of these cases included “propaganda against the regime” and “spreading false information.”

In Fars Province, Mostafa Ansari, head of the Lawyers’ Support Commission of the Fars and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Regional Bar Association, stated that following the January 2026 protests, judicial cases were opened against approximately 20 lawyers, 12 of whom were arrested.

In Gilan Province, at least 10 lawyers were summoned by judicial and security authorities, without their names being made public.

An attorney who asked not to be named for security reasons told HRANA that around November 2025, IRGC Intelligence forces went to the offices or homes of a number of lawyers in Gilan Province, including the president and several officials of the province’s Bar Association, and confiscated their mobile phones and other belongings.

According to the source, cases were also opened against two other lawyers. However, no information is available regarding their identities or the details of their cases.

Because the exact number of individuals subjected to these actions during the visits by security forces in Gilan is unclear, these cases were not included in the final total of 135 lawyers.

Summonses, Judicial Cases, and Restrictions on Lawyers’ Professional Activities

In addition to arrests and prison sentences, a number of lawyers during this period faced summonses, the opening of judicial cases, judicial and disciplinary proceedings, and restrictions on their ability to continue practicing law. Reza Tayyebnia, Amir Raisian, Milad Panahipour, Reza Shafakhah, Reza Gharloghi, Iman Soleimani, Hassan Younesi, Khosrow Alikordi, Nasser Rezaei Ahangarani, and Behnam Nezadi were among them. Details of the documented cases involving each of these lawyers are provided below.

Reza Tayyebnia was summoned in August 2026 to Branch 6 of the Assistant Prosecutor’s Office of the Kohgiluyeh County Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office.

Amir Raisian and Milad Panahipour had judicial cases opened against them in May 2026 at Branch 3 of the Tehran Security Prosecutor’s Office. The charges brought against them were “spreading false information” and “propaganda against the regime.”

Reza Shafakhah received a summons in December 2025 ordering him to appear before District 16 of the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office to defend himself against the charge of “spreading false information.”

Reza Gharloghi, an attorney residing in Karaj, faced disciplinary proceedings in October 2025 following comments he made online. The indictment in his case was referred to Branch 1 of the Disciplinary Court of the Bar Association.

Iman Soleimani, an attorney in Khuzestan, faced a request for the revocation of his license to practice law and renewed disciplinary proceedings in September 2025. He had previously faced charges including “propaganda against the regime,” “insulting religious sanctities,” and “insulting the Supreme Leader,” but the case had been declared closed. Nevertheless, the same evidence was once again referred to the Lawyers’ Disciplinary Court along with a request to revoke his license to practice law. The court acquitted him, but the disciplinary prosecutor appealed the ruling, and the case was referred to the Supreme Disciplinary Court for Judges.

Hassan Younesi was also interrogated at the Culture and Media Prosecutor’s Office in August 2025 and, by judicial order, was prohibited from engaging in online activity for three months.

Khosrow Alikordi, an attorney in Razavi Khorasan Province, was barred from pursuing further education in September 2025. He died on December 5, 2025. Because the action against him occurred within the period covered by this report, his name has been included among the identified lawyers documented in the report.

Nasser Rezaei Ahangarani was assaulted by security forces on the evening of January 3, 2026, during protests in Khorramabad.

Behnam Nezadi also faced judicial proceedings in connection with his work as a lawyer, but was ultimately acquitted by Branch 31 of the Tehran Province Court of Appeals.

Additionally, according to information received by HRANA, since January 2026 at least three other lawyers have received warnings in connection with content published on their personal social media accounts, and their pages were made inaccessible for at least two months. HRANA has not yet verified the identities of these individuals; therefore, these three cases were not included in the report’s final total.

Impact on Access to Legal Representation

The continuation of this trend, in addition to its direct impact on the lawyers involved in these cases, may also affect citizens’ ability to access legal counsel and receive an effective defense. Attorneys play an essential role in safeguarding defendants’ right to a defense in many judicial cases, particularly those involving civil rights and security-related charges.

Conclusion

The data compiled in this report indicate that over the past year, a number of lawyers have faced judicial and security-related actions not merely because of the circumstances of their clients, but also in connection with their own legal activities, public statements, and conduct in their professional capacity as attorneys. Continued monitoring of this trend is essential for assessing the extent to which citizens have independent and unrestricted access to legal services.

Record of HRA’s Germany Accountability Initiative

Posted on September 8, 2026October 12, 2026 by . .

News, Other, Publications

Berlin event, HRANA, Jennifer Connet, Sina Yousefi, Skylar Thompson, UpRights, Valérie Gabard, Völkerstrafgesetzbuch

HRANA– In September 2026, Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) launched a legal and advocacy initiative aimed at advancing accountability for alleged crimes against humanity committed by Iranian State authorities. At the center of this effort was HRA’s submission to Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General requesting the opening of a structural investigation (Strukturermittlungsverfahren) into the situation in Iran, with a particular evidentiary focus on the repression surrounding the nationwide protests of December 2025 and January 2026.

1. Overview

HRA submitted the request on September 1, 2026, with legal support from UpRights and German counsel. The nearly 109-page submission was the product of months of intensive investigation and drew on more than 60 interviews with victims, witnesses, and family members inside and outside Iran, together with extensive documentary and digital evidence. HRA also conducted weapons and injury analysis and mapped suspected perpetrators, relevant institutions, and command structures. The submission identifies upwards of 50 suspected perpetrators and analyzes their roles, institutional affiliations, links to documented incidents, and positions within relevant command structures.

The filing was accompanied by a coordinated public-engagement effort intended to explain the legal strategy, bring greater attention to the evidence documented by HRA, and build support for sustained accountability work. This included a public event in Berlin on September 3 bringing together German policymakers, lawyers, civil society representatives, media, and human rights practitioners; an article in Just Security explaining why Germany is particularly well placed to act and why investigative work should begin now; and an upcoming Just Access podcast addressing the filing.

Together, these activities sought to advance a central proposition underlying HRA’s work: documentation undertaken today can create the evidentiary foundation for accountability opportunities that may arise years later.

2. The Criminal Complaint and Request for a Structural Investigation

The submission asks Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General to open a structural investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed by Iranian State authorities under Section 7 of the German Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, VStGB). HRA argues that the information submitted provides sufficient factual indications of multiple underlying acts potentially amounting to crimes against humanity and meets the threshold under Section 152(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure for opening an investigation.

The submission focuses principally on the nationwide protests that began on December 28, 2025. What began with shopkeepers and bazaar merchants in Tehran rapidly developed into a nationwide movement encompassing at least 203 cities across all 31 provinces. HRA documented 682 protest events, including 627 street demonstrations and 55 university assemblies.

According to HRA’s verified minimum figures at the time of submission, at least 7,068 people were killed, including 6,548 protesters, 236 children, and 77 other civilians, and at least 53,987 people were arrested or detained. HRA also documented at least 369 forced confessions broadcast through State and associated media. HRA emphasizes that these figures are verified minimums and do not purport to capture the full scale of the alleged violations.

Nature and Patterns of the Alleged Crimes

The evidence presented describes an alleged nationwide campaign involving multiple organs of the Iranian State, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Basij forces, the Law Enforcement Command (LEF), intelligence and security forces, and the Judiciary.

The submission documents allegations including unlawful killings and mass shootings; arbitrary arrest and mass detention; enforced disappearance and incommunicado detention; torture and other ill-treatment; forced confessions; sexual violence; politically motivated persecution; interference with access to medical treatment; intimidation and coercion of victims’ families; interference with funerals, burials, and the recovery of bodies; and the use of capital proceedings and death sentences following manifestly unfair trials. More than 50 representative incidents are included to illustrate alleged criminal conduct across different locations, victim profiles, State institutions, and methods of repression.

HRA’s investigation also identified recurring features across geographically dispersed locations. These included the use of live ammunition, pellet-firing weapons, tear gas, and other forms of force against predominantly unarmed protesters and bystanders. The submission further describes a correlation between the nationwide telecommunications shutdown, the deliberate shutdown of public street lighting, and a marked escalation in lethal and other unlawful force. HRA argues that the recurrence of substantially similar methods across different locations indicates a coordinated pattern rather than a series of isolated incidents.

The submission also addresses alleged abuses following arrest. HRA documented reports of incommunicado detention, denial of access to lawyers, coerced confessions, expedited proceedings involving capital offenses, and death sentences following proceedings lacking basic fair-trial guarantees. It argues that these practices raise serious concerns that the criminal justice system itself has been used as an additional instrument of repression against protesters and perceived dissidents.

Suspected Perpetrators and Institutional Structures

A significant component of the investigation involved moving beyond documentation of individual incidents to examine who may bear responsibility for the alleged crimes.

The submission identifies nearly 50 suspected perpetrators and analyzes their positions, institutional affiliations, geographical areas of responsibility, links to representative incidents, and roles within relevant command structures. They include commanders within the IRGC, Basij, and LEF; heads of intelligence departments; governors; prison officials; prosecutors; and judicial authorities. The underlying information draws in part on HRA’s Spreading Justice Database and Pasdaran Documentation Project Database.

This perpetrator mapping was intended not to prejudge individual criminal responsibility, but to preserve and organize information relevant to determining how particular individuals, units, institutions, and command structures may have contributed to the alleged crimes.

3. Why a Structural Investigation

The request for a structural investigation reflects the nature of both the alleged crimes and the practical obstacles to accountability.

Unlike an investigation centered from the outset on a particular available suspect, a structural investigation would allow German prosecutors to examine the broader factual and organizational structures underlying the alleged crimes; collect and preserve testimonial, documentary, and digital evidence; identify patterns connecting individual incidents; map relevant State institutions and units; establish command structures and institutional relationships; and assess the potential responsibility of individuals who may have planned, ordered, facilitated, contributed to, or directly committed the underlying acts.

Although the December 2025–January 2026 crackdown provides the submission’s principal evidentiary focus, HRA argues that an investigation should not necessarily be confined to that period. The submission situates the recent events within a broader recurring pattern of repression against perceived opponents and civilian protesters, including the response to the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests.

The objective is therefore both immediate and long-term: to preserve evidence and investigate structures now, rather than waiting until an individual suspected of involvement happens to become available to German authorities.

4. Why Germany

HRA argues that there is currently no realistic domestic route to accountability in Iran for alleged crimes committed by State authorities. Iran is not a State Party to the Rome Statute and has not lodged a declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction, leaving the ICC without jurisdiction over crimes committed wholly within Iran absent an unlikely United Nations Security Council referral.

At the same time, there are concrete links between the alleged crimes, available evidence, and Germany and the wider European context.

Victims, Witnesses, and Evidence in Europe

Victims, witnesses, and family members of people killed, injured, tortured, arbitrarily detained, or otherwise affected are already outside Iran. HRA has interviewed individuals who fled following the protests and are in Turkey or reaching EU countries, as well as victims and family members elsewhere in Europe and North America. HRA anticipates that continuing displacement may result in additional victims and witnesses reaching Europe.

Germany’s substantial Iranian diaspora provides additional possibilities for identifying witnesses and securing testimonial, documentary, and other evidence. A German structural investigation could also facilitate cooperation with other European jurisdictions in identifying and interviewing victims and witnesses and preserving evidence for possible future proceedings.

Potential Future Presence of Suspects

HRA has also documented past travel to Germany and other European States by senior current and former Iranian officials, including IRGC, government, and judicial officials, for personal, family-related, and medical reasons. HRA argues that these patterns make it realistic that persons potentially implicated in the alleged crimes may enter or transit through Germany or another European jurisdiction in the future, even though it is impossible to predict precisely who will travel, when, or where.

A structural investigation would therefore allow the evidentiary and investigative groundwork to be developed before such a situation arises, rather than requiring prosecutors to begin from scratch once a potential suspect comes within reach.

Transnational Repression

HRA further situates Germany’s interest within the context of Iranian State-sponsored transnational repression. It describes links between Iranian State actors—including the IRGC, Quds Force, Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and associated networks—and surveillance, intimidation, threats, attempted abductions, and assassination plots targeting perceived opponents abroad. The submission notes that members of the Iranian diaspora have faced threats and intimidation in Germany and argues that some State actors implicated in domestic repression are also linked to increased transnational activities targeting perceived opponents outside Iran.

Together, the availability of evidence and witnesses, potential future presence of suspects, Germany’s Iranian diaspora, transnational repression affecting Germany, and Germany’s experience with structural investigations form the principal practical nexus supporting HRA’s request.

5. September 3 Berlin Event

Two days after the submission, HRA and UpRights convened a panel event in Berlin to publicly announce the filing and discuss its significance. The audience included German policymakers, lawyers, civil society representatives, media, activists, and human rights practitioners.

The panel was moderated by Skylar Thompson, Deputy Director of HRA, and featured Jennifer Connet, Legal Advisor at HRA; Valérie Gabard, Co-Director of UpRights; and Sina Yousefi, an Iranian human rights lawyer and former Deputy Chair of the Human Rights Commission of the East Azerbaijan Bar Association.

Skylar Thompson

Thompson provided the broader context for HRA and UpRights’ efforts to pursue legal action in Germany and discussed plans for continued cooperation with investigative and prosecutorial efforts across Europe. She emphasized the importance of sustained documentation and international coordination, particularly as victims and witnesses continue to leave Iran and opportunities for accountability may emerge unpredictably. She also underscored that systematic documentation is the foundation on which both present and future accountability efforts depend.

Sina Yousefi

Yousefi brought the perspective of an Iranian human rights lawyer who had practiced in Iran in the aftermath of the 2022 nationwide protests. Drawing on his professional and personal experience, he discussed patterns of repression directed against protesters and explained why the events following the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests remain relevant to understanding the more recent crackdown.

His contribution also reinforced an important aspect of the submission: the December 2025–January 2026 crackdown should not necessarily be understood in isolation from recurring patterns of State repression documented during earlier protest movements. The Executive Summary similarly asks German prosecutors to consider the broader situation in Iran, including alleged international crimes committed in connection with the 2022 protests.

Jennifer Connet

Connet presented aspects of HRA’s investigation and its engagement with victims and witnesses. She discussed the scale of HRA’s documentation and emphasized that the investigation depended fundamentally on the courage and trust of individuals who shared their experiences and evidence, including people who remain inside Iran.

Her presentation placed individual testimony within the broader patterns identified through HRA’s investigation: killings and shootings, injuries caused by live ammunition and pellet weapons, fear of seeking medical treatment, detention and torture, forced confessions, interference with families’ efforts to recover and bury their relatives, and other alleged abuses. These individual experiences form part of the evidentiary basis through which HRA has sought to identify patterns extending across locations, institutions, and stages of the crackdown.

Valérie Gabard

Gabard explained why a structural investigation is particularly suited to the allegations documented by HRA. As she emphasized, the alleged crimes are not connected simply to one suspect or one isolated incident, but to a broader State-backed system. A structural investigation can therefore provide a framework for investigating the broader situation while supporting potential future criminal accountability.

This closely reflects the rationale set out in the complaint: German prosecutors would be able to examine organizational structures and patterns, preserve evidence, identify relevant institutions and command relationships, and assess potential individual responsibility without waiting for a particular suspect to become immediately available.

The event concluded with questions from participants and a broader discussion about legal strategies, practical challenges, and opportunities for pursuing accountability beyond Iran, including the role German and European civil society could play as the initiative develops.

6. Extending the Initiative Beyond the Filing

The Germany initiative extended beyond the formal submission and the September 3 Berlin event. HRA also sought to bring the legal and strategic questions raised by the filing into broader legal, policy, and public discussions, with particular emphasis on why investigative action is possible before a specific suspect becomes available to German authorities.

As part of this effort, HRA’s Skylar Thompson and Jennifer Connet published an article in Just Security examining the strategic rationale for opening a structural investigation in Germany. While the submission sets out the underlying evidence and legal basis for HRA’s request, the article situates that request within the broader practice of universal-jurisdiction accountability. It emphasizes the value of beginning investigative work before the future presence of a particular suspect can be predicted, drawing on Germany’s experience with structural investigations concerning other situations, including Syria and Ukraine.

Together, these engagements form part of HRA’s broader effort to ensure that the filing serves not only as a submission of evidence to German authorities, but also as a basis for sustained engagement with legal practitioners, policymakers, civil society, and others working on accountability for alleged crimes committed in Iran.

7. Civil Society Engagement and Next Steps

The submission expressly contemplates continued cooperation between German authorities and civil society organizations possessing relevant evidence and expertise. HRA asks the Federal Prosecutor General to engage directly with HRA and other organizations that have documented the events. It notes that civil society organizations have established trusted relationships with victims and witnesses, accumulated substantial documentation concerning incidents and suspected perpetrators, and developed contextual and technical expertise that can support investigative efforts.

HRA has stated its readiness to cooperate with German authorities, including by facilitating access to relevant information and, where appropriate and subject to necessary safeguards and informed consent, supporting engagement with victims and witnesses.

The Berlin event was therefore not simply a launch event. It was also intended to begin a longer conversation with German policymakers, lawyers, and civil society about how these constituencies can support accountability efforts after the filing itself. The legal submission provides the formal request; continued documentation, engagement with victims and witnesses, monitoring of potential suspects, civil society coordination, and engagement with prosecutorial authorities constitute the next phase.

8. Significance of the Initiative

The September 2026 initiative brings together several strands of HRA’s work: documentation of individual violations; analysis of patterns of repression; identification and mapping of suspected perpetrators and State institutions; engagement with victims and witnesses; legal analysis; and advocacy aimed at translating that documentation into concrete accountability opportunities.

The filing is particularly significant because it seeks to convert a substantial body of civil society documentation into an investigative framework capable of supporting accountability over the long term. The Executive Summary argues that the alleged crimes were neither isolated nor confined to particular perpetrators, but formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population involving multiple State institutions. HRA therefore asks German prosecutors to investigate the structures, patterns, evidence, and potential responsibility underlying the alleged crimes rather than waiting until a particular suspect becomes available.

Justice Beyond Borders: HRA Files Criminal Complaint and Holds Event in Berlin

Posted on September 3, 2026September 8, 2026 by Hrana

Activites, News, Publications

Berlin event, Spreading Justice

Berlin — On September 3, 2026, as Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) filed a criminal complaint with Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor General concerning the crackdown on Iran’s nationwide protests, prominent lawyers, activists, and human rights experts gathered in Berlin to examine legal avenues for pursuing accountability for serious human rights violations committed during the protests.

The event, held at betahaus in Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, was hosted by Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) and UpRights.

The panel was moderated by Skylar Thompson, Deputy Director at HRA, and featured Jennifer Connet, Legal Advisor at HRA; Valérie Gabard, Co-Director of UpRights; and Sina Yousefi, an Iranian human rights lawyer and former Deputy Chair of the Human Rights Commission of the East Azerbaijan Bar Association.

Panelists examined HRA’s investigation into the crackdown, including more than 60 interviews conducted with victims and witnesses, as well as extensive perpetrator mapping. They also discussed why Germany was chosen as a jurisdiction in which to pursue accountability and HRA’s plans to continue supporting judicial action against individuals allegedly responsible for abuses committed during the crackdown, including through accountability efforts across Europe.

Skylar Thompson outlined efforts by HRA and UpRights to pursue legal action in Germany in connection with the crackdown and discussed plans to continue this work through cooperation with investigative and prosecutorial efforts across Europe. As victims and witnesses continue to leave Iran while alleged perpetrators remain shielded by impunity, Thompson emphasized the importance of sustained documentation and international coordination.

Thompson stressed that documentation provides the foundation for both present and future accountability efforts and has been fundamental to HRA’s filing in Germany.

Sina Yousefi reflected on his experience practicing law in Iran in the aftermath of the 2022 nationwide protests and described patterns of repression targeting protesters. He emphasized that those experiences have not occurred in a vacuum and are in fact relevant to our understanding of recent events.

Jennifer Connet discussed HRA’s months of documentation and engagement with victims and witnesses. Connet emphasized that the courage and trust of victims and witnesses have been essential to documenting alleged violations and creating opportunities to pursue judicial avenues at the international level.

Valérie Gabard, Co-Director of UpRights, addressed the complaint filed by HRA and UpRights with German prosecutors, stating:

“Since the crimes committed in Iran are not linked to a single suspect or an isolated incident, but rather to a state-backed system that has been operating for several decades, requesting a structural investigation [within the German judicial system] makes sense, as such an investigation can establish a framework that supports future criminal accountability [of the Iranian government].”

The event concluded with questions from participants and a broader discussion of the legal strategies, challenges, and opportunities associated with pursuing accountability beyond Iran’s borders.

Criminal Complaint Filed in Germany

The Berlin event followed HRA’s filing of a criminal complaint with Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor General on September 3, 2026, seeking the opening of a structural investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed in Iran under Section 7 of Germany’s Code of Crimes against International Law (VStGB). The complaint draws on extensive documentation and evidence collected by HRA. Further details on the filing, its legal basis, and the underlying evidence are available in HRA’s report on the criminal complaint.

Escalation of Judicial Crackdown on Protesters: A Review of the Most Significant Cases from the Past Two Weeks

Posted on July 24, 2026July 24, 2026 by . .

Executions, Freedom of Expression, News, Publications

HRANA – Over the past two weeks, Iranian authorities have sharply escalated the use of capital punishment in cases linked to the January 2026 protests and politically motivated or national security prosecutions. Death sentences have been issued, upheld, and carried out across multiple cities, signaling an intensification of the judiciary’s crackdown on protesters and other defendants facing political and security-related charges.

According to HRANA, over the past two weeks, judicial proceedings in a number of cases related to the January 2026 protests and other security-related cases have entered a new phase, marked by the issuance and implementation of death sentences, the commencement of trials, and growing concerns over the condition of detainees.

The cases reviewed by HRANA span Isfahan, Shahrud, Mashhad, Tehran, Shiraz, Mahallat, Karaj, and Tabriz. They are accompanied by persistent allegations of fair trial violations, including denial of effective access to legal counsel, forced confessions, court hearings held inside prisons or conducted remotely, and a lack of transparency regarding the evidence relied upon by the courts. HRANA’s findings indicate that at least seven prisoners in protest- and security-related cases were executed during this period.

This report examines the most prominent recent cases that have resulted in death sentences or executions, or in which defendants are facing charges such as “enmity against God” (moharebeh) and “spreading corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz). In cases where the available information is based solely on reports received by HRANA, the agency explicitly notes this and continues its independent investigation into the details of each case, including judicial proceedings, defendants’ access to legal counsel, and the evidence relied upon by the courts.

Several of these cases have drawn particular attention not only because of the number of defendants and the severity of the sentences, but also due to questions surrounding the judicial process. Reported concerns in some of these cases include restrictions on defense lawyers’ access to case files, court sessions held remotely or inside prisons, the failure to provide some families with the full text of court verdicts, and allegations that confessions were obtained under coercion.

Among these, the cases known as the “Alikhani Square” case and the “Isfahan Shohada Square” case have emerged as some of the most prominent during this period due to the harsh sentences imposed, the large number of defendants, and unresolved concerns regarding the judicial process. Meanwhile, the issuance of death sentences and the continuation of proceedings in similar cases in Shahrud, Mashhad, Shandiz, Shiraz, Mahallat, Tehran, and Malekan indicate that this pattern is not confined to a single city or a single case.

Below are the details of the cases for which HRANA has independently gathered and verified information, including the charges brought against the defendants, the course of judicial proceedings, and the status of the sentences from issuance through implementation.

Isfahan

The “Alikhani Square” Case: Death Sentences Issued and Carried Out Against Several Detainees

In this case, 59 individuals arrested during the January 2026 protests in Isfahan have been tried. According to information received by HRANA, 14 of them have been sentenced to death. HRANA has so far verified the identities of 12 of those sentenced to death.

The case was opened in connection with events that took place on January 8, 2026 in Alikhani Square in Isfahan, where the judiciary has alleged that police forces were attacked, public property was damaged, and violent acts were committed. The defendants face charges including “enmity against God” (moharebeh), destruction of public property, offenses related to attacks on law enforcement officers, and the killing of four members of the police force.

HRANA has verified the identities of the 12 defendants sentenced to death as Alireza Sepahi, Abolfazl Sepahi, Erfan Esfandiari, Gol Mohammad Mohammadi, Ghaem Hosseini, Sharvin Bagherian, Amirhossein Safari, Amirhossein Maleki, Ali Dashti, Abolfazl Ebrahimi, Alireza Raeisi, and Amirhossein Ebrahimi Analoucheh.

In the early hours of July 19, the death sentences of Erfan Esfandiari and Gol Mohammad Mohammadi were carried out. Subsequently, the transfer of Alireza Sepahi and Abolfazl Sepahi to solitary confinement has heightened concerns that the death sentences of the remaining condemned prisoners in this case may soon be implemented.

The handling of this case has raised serious concerns regarding compliance with fair trial standards. According to information received by HRANA, court hearings were conducted via video conference, and lawyers and the families of some defendants were denied access to the complete case files and the full text of the court’s verdicts. Additionally, some defendants were reportedly subjected to pressure and torture during interrogations in order to compel them to admit to the charges against them.

The “Shohada Square” Case

This case stems from the January 2026 protests in Isfahan and involves 16 defendants currently facing judicial proceedings. It relates to incidents that occurred in the vicinity of Shohada Square in Isfahan, near several shoe stores, during which two individuals were killed.

The charges brought against most of the defendants include “enmity against God” (moharebeh) through carrying bladed weapons, destruction of public property amounting to moharebeh, assembly and collusion, and propaganda against the state. Two of the defendants are charged with complicity in moharebeh and complicity in the destruction of public property.

HRANA has verified the identities of 12 of the defendants: Ahmadreza Saeedi, Navid Elyasi, Abolfazl Dadgostar, Mehdi Mansouri, Hamed Mehralian, Mehdi Asadi, Milad Booari, Mehrdad Booari, Ali Booari, Taraneh Rahimi, Romina Rahimi, and Setayesh Saedi.

The handling of this case has also raised concerns regarding judicial procedure. Although the case was formally registered with Branch 5 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court, the defendants’ charges have been adjudicated by judges from Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court in the same city. Hearings have been held inside Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan before Judge Morteza Barati and Judge Mohammadreza Tavakkoli, with a representative of the prosecutor’s office also present.

The defendants are being held in Dastgerd and Dowlatabad Prisons in Isfahan. Their defense lawyers have stated that they were not granted full access to the case files prior to the hearings. Additionally, some defendants were reportedly subjected to torture during interrogations.

It is also noteworthy that the indictment issued against these defendants does not contain any specific charge related to the killing of the two individuals who died during the Shohada Square incidents. According to information received by HRANA, no evidence has been presented demonstrating the defendants’ direct involvement in those deaths.

Execution of the Death Sentence of Mohammad Amini Dehaghani

The case of Mohammad Amini Dehaqani is related to the January 2026 protests in Dehaqan County, Isfahan Province. According to the judiciary’s media outlet, he was sentenced to death on charges of “setting fire to the Dehaqan governor’s office and police station by throwing Molotov cocktails” and “destroying public property in Imam Hossein Square” in the city. His death sentence was carried out on July 15, 2026, at Isfahan Prison.

According to publicly available information, the execution was carried out following judicial proceedings and the confirmation of the final verdict by the Supreme Court. HRANA has not yet been able to independently verify the details of the case, the judicial process, the evidence relied upon by the court, or the defendant’s legal defense. Further investigation into the case is ongoing.

Death Sentence Issued for Mahnam Navab Safavi

The case of Mahnam Navab Safavi, a 22-year-old rapper from Isfahan, is related to the nationwide protests of 2026. He was arrested on January 10, 2026, and was subsequently sentenced to death by Branch 5 of the Isfahan Revolutionary Court.

The charges brought against him include “enmity against God” (moharebeh) through the destruction of public property in the Sheikh Sadough area of Isfahan, “propaganda against the state,” “assembly and collusion,” “encouraging people to kill one another,” and “writing slogans.”

According to information received by HRANA, he is currently being held in Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan. HRANA has also received information indicating that he was subjected to forced confessions during his detention and that his trial was conducted remotely. HRANA is continuing to investigate the details of the case, the judicial proceedings, the defendant’s access to legal counsel, and the evidence relied upon by the court.

Kermanshah

Execution of the Death Sentences of Two Defendants Convicted of “Armed Rebellion”

This case dates back to 2017 and concerns allegations of membership in an armed group and activities against the Islamic Republic. The judiciary’s media outlet claimed that Mohi al-Din Abdollahi and Hossein Palani were “members of a group affiliated with ISIS” who intended to carry out armed operations inside Iran. According to this claim, following court proceedings, the Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced both men to death on the charge of “armed rebellion against the Islamic Republic of Iran” (baghi).

After the Supreme Court upheld the verdicts, the death sentences of the two prisoners were carried out in the early hours of July 14, 2026, at Dizelabad Prison in Kermanshah.

The judiciary’s media outlet stated that, following the completion of the investigation and the issuance of the indictment, the case was referred to the Tehran Revolutionary Court, which ultimately issued the death sentences.

Soroush Karami Remains in Judicial Limbo on the Charge of “Enmity Against God”

The case of Soroush Karami, a resident of Kermanshah, is related to the January 2026 protests in Kermanshah. He was arrested during the protests on January 8, 2026, and has been charged with “enmity against God” (moharebeh). His case is currently under review by Branch 16 of the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office in Kermanshah.

He was transferred from a security detention facility to Kermanshah Central Prison (Dizelabad) and is currently being held in solitary confinement in the prison’s security ward.

Soroush Karami has been denied access to legal counsel since the time of his arrest.

Karaj

Execution of Aref Khoshkar

The case of Aref Khoshkar was related to the nationwide protests of 2022 in Tehran. He was arrested during protests in the Fallah neighborhood and sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court on charges including “enmity against God through carrying and using a weapon,” “the killing of a member of the Basij,” and “assembly and collusion against national security.”

Aref Khoshkar’s death sentence was carried out on July 15, 2026, at Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj, after his family’s efforts to halt the execution and a meeting aimed at obtaining the victim’s family’s consent proved unsuccessful.

According to information received by HRANA, Aref Khoshkar’s lawyer had previously pointed to ambiguities in the case, stating that there were no surveillance cameras at the site of the killing and that there was insufficient evidence linking the charges to his client.

Execution of Mehdi Khanki

The case of Mehdi Khanki, age 26, was related to the January 2026 protests in Karaj. According to the Judiciary Media Center, he had been sentenced to death on charges including “operational activities in support of Israel, the United States, and hostile groups” and “manufacturing, procuring, and possessing firearms and military ammunition, and using them.”

He was arrested by security forces at his residence in Karaj on February 10, 2026. After the Supreme Court upheld his sentence, he was executed on Wednesday, July 15, 2026, at Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj.

According to the judiciary, the case was heard by a branch of the Karaj Revolutionary Court, which issued the death sentence. HRANA has not yet been able to independently examine the details of the case, the evidence relied upon by the court, or the judicial proceedings. Further investigation into the matter is ongoing.

Shahrud: Death Sentence Issued for Arvin Kheirkhahan

The case of Arvin Kheirkhahan, aged approximately 20, is related to the January 2026 protests in Shahrud. He was arrested during the protests and is currently being held in Shahrud Prison.

He has been sentenced to death on charges of “enmity against God” (moharebeh) and “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz). His case has now been referred to the Supreme Court for review. To date, no detailed information has been made public regarding the branch handling the case, his access to legal counsel, or the details of the judicial proceedings.

Mashhad: Majid Nikandish Sentenced to Death

The case of Majid Nikandish, a 25-year-old resident of Quchan, is related to the January 2026 protests in Mashhad. He was arrested during the protests and is currently being held in Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad.

He was tried by Branch 1 of the Mashhad Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Gholamreza Akbari, and sentenced to death on the charge of “enmity against God” (moharebeh). According to information received by HRANA, he remains detained in Vakilabad Prison. HRANA has also received information indicating that he was subjected to forced confessions during his detention. The organization is continuing to investigate the details of the case, the judicial proceedings, and other aspects of his prosecution.

Shandiz: Mehdi Zarif Sentenced to Death

The case of Mehdi Zarif, aged 22, is related to the January 2026 protests in Shandiz. He was arrested in Shandiz on January 10, 2026.

He has been sentenced to death on charges including the destruction of public property. His death sentence has been upheld by the Supreme Court. According to information received by HRANA, he was subjected to forced confessions during interrogation.

Tehran: Mohammadreza Abdollahpour

The case of Mohammadreza Abdollahpour, one of those arrested during the 2026 nationwide protests, involves charges including “espionage” and the killing of a police officer during the January 9, 2026 protests in Tehran’s Saadat Abad district.

Following his arrest, he has spent more than five months in detention and remains held at Ghezel Hesar Prison in Karaj without a verdict having been issued.

According to information received by HRANA, court hearings in his case were held in April–May 2026, but no judgment has yet been issued. A source close to his family also stated that he has been denied access to a lawyer of his own choosing.

At present, little additional information is available regarding the judicial proceedings in this case. It is only known that Mohammadreza Abdollahpour’s trial sessions have been held, but no verdict has yet been issued.

The following cases are based on information that is still under review. HRANA is currently verifying the details of these cases, including the judicial proceedings, the legal status of the defendants, and other relevant aspects.

Shahrud: Protester Morteza Zamani Sentenced to Death

The case of Morteza Zamani, a 27-year-old resident of Shahrud, is related to the January 2026 protests in the city. He was arrested on January 8, 2026, during protests on Istgah Street in Shahrud and was subsequently transferred to Shahrud Prison.

Morteza Zamani has been sentenced to death on the charge of “enmity against God” (moharebeh) through the destruction and arson of public property.

No detailed information is currently available regarding the specifics of the case, the judicial proceedings, or his access to legal counsel. HRANA’s investigation into these matters is ongoing.

Shiraz: Two Citizens Sentenced to Death in Connection with the January Protests

The case of two citizens in Shiraz is related to the January 2026 protests. In this case, both defendants were sentenced to death by Branch 1 of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court.

The charges brought against them include “enmity against God” (moharebeh) through setting fire to public places and burning a Quran, as well as “acting against national security by sheltering protesters.” Their death sentences were issued more than two months ago.

The two defendants have been identified as 23-year-old Mojtaba Dehbandi and 27-year-old Kianoush Hamzehei Kazerouni. Following their arrest, they were transferred to Adelabad Prison in Shiraz.

The death sentences were issued at the trial court level and are not yet final. HRANA’s investigation into the details of the judicial proceedings, the defendants’ access to legal counsel, and the evidence relied upon by the court is ongoing.

Malekan: Ehsan Khodadadi

The case of Ehsan Khodadadi, a 32-year-old resident of Malekan, has been under investigation since June 2025 in connection with national security charges. The central allegations in the case involve claims that he sent the location of an Iranian Air Force facility in Tabriz, attempted to establish contact with Mossad, and transmitted information to the Iran International television network.

Ehsan Khodadadi has now been sentenced to death by Branch 1 of the Tabriz Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Reza Abdi. He was convicted on charges of “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz) through espionage for the benefit of the Israeli regime, “security, cultural, media, and propaganda activities for Israel,” “cooperation with hostile states,” “propaganda against the state,” and “cooperation through providing information to media outlets opposed to the regime.”

He is currently being held in Tabriz Prison. Reports have alleged that Ehsan Khodadadi was subjected to pressure, torture, and forced confessions during interrogation. HRANA has not been able to independently verify these claims. HRANA’s investigation into the details of the case, the judicial proceedings, the defendant’s access to legal counsel, and the evidence relied upon by the court is ongoing.

Tehran: Two Defendants Sentenced to Death in Connection with the January 2026 Protests

The case of three individuals arrested during the January 2026 protests in Tehran has resulted in severe sentences, including two death penalties. They were arrested on January 11, 2026, and their case was subsequently heard by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Abolghasem Salavati.

The charges brought against the defendants include “attacking a mosque with Molotov cocktails,” “participation in unlawful gatherings,” and “assembly and collusion.”

The defendants have been identified as Mehdi Nazer, Mahnaz Chardouli, and Atefeh Nazer. Mehdi Nazer and Mahnaz Chardouli were each sentenced to death and 10 years’ imprisonment, while Atefeh Nazer was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.

Lordegan: Ali Rahimi-Rigi Faces Political and Security Charges

The case of Ali Rahimi-Rigi, a 31-year-old detainee arrested during the January 2026 protests, stems from events related to those protests. He faces a range of charges, including “enmity against God” (moharebeh), “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz), possession and carrying of firearms and ammunition, destruction of property, unlawful assembly, propaganda against the state, assembly and collusion against national security, brandishing a weapon, and disrupting public order. He is currently being held in Lordegan Prison.

No detailed information has been made public regarding the branch handling his case, his access to legal counsel, or the evidence relied upon by the court. HRANA’s investigation into the details of the judicial proceedings is ongoing.

Mahallat: Five Protest Detainees Sentenced to Death

Five individuals arrested during the January 2026 protests in Mahallat, Markazi Province, have been sentenced to death by a judicial authority on the charge of “enmity against God” (moharebeh). Their death sentences were issued at the trial court level and are not yet final.

The defendants have been identified as Erfan Khalili, Ali Akbar Mahlouji, Hessam Isaei, Hossein Shokouhi, and Abolghasem Kazem Aslani. They are currently being held in Arak Prison.

HRANA’s investigation into the judicial proceedings, the defendants’ access to legal counsel, and the evidence relied upon by the court is ongoing.

Arak: 18-Year-Old Mahan Rahmati Faces Charge of “Enmity Against God”

The case of Mahan Rahmati, a resident of Arak born in January 2008, is related to the January 2026 protests. He has been charged with “enmity against God” (moharebeh), an offense that may carry the death penalty. He remains in detention, and recent information has heightened concerns regarding both the judicial proceedings in his case and the conditions of his detention.

Overall, during the past two weeks, at least 50 individuals arrested in connection with the January 2026 protests have either been executed, sentenced to death, had their death sentences upheld, or faced charges such as “enmity against God” (moharebeh) and “corruption on earth” (efsad-e fel-arz), offenses that can carry the death penalty. The cases of a number of these individuals remain under investigation or judicial review, and complete information regarding the legal proceedings and court rulings is not yet available.

Background: The January 2026 Protests

It should be noted that protests and strikes by shopkeepers and bazaar merchants began in Tehran on Sunday, December 28, 2025, and within two days spread beyond markets and commercial centers. With the participation of students, citizens, and various social groups, these protests became one of the largest protest movements of recent years. Following the crackdown by security and law enforcement forces, thousands were killed or injured, and tens of thousands were arrested or summoned by security agencies. For more information, readers may refer to HRANA’s comprehensive report titled “Crimson Winter,” documenting the first fifty days following the outbreak of Iran’s nationwide protests.